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This Article presents a new model for analyzing securities-fraud claims. It
then discusses the pleading and stay-of-discovery requirements enacted by
Congress in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the
"Reform Act"), arguing that the combined impact of these provisions is
likely to be overinclusive.
The Reform Act's pleading standard is best understood in light of the
common law preceding it. To survive a motion to dismiss under pre-Reform
Act pleading standards, plaintiffs had to plead specific types of facts derived
from internal company information. Plaintiffs met this internal-information
standard through the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's liberal
discovery provisions. The Reform Act, aimed at abusive securities litigation,
both prohibits such discovery and heightens the pleading standard necessary
to survive a motion to dismiss. By combining these reforms, the Reform Act
implements a standard that is outcome determinative and, if strictly applied,
virtually impossible to meet.
Early decisions under the Reform Act illustrate the outcome
determinative impact of these provisions and reveal that despite Congress's
stated intent to resolve the circuit split on the applicable pleading standard,
the Reform Act's language and legislative history have left the courts in a
quandary. As a result, the beginning of a new circuit split is already apparent.
To resolve these problems, I propose that Congress repeal the stay-of-
discovery requirements and, instead, adopt managerial-judge provisions to
process securities fraud claims. Such a mechanism would better balance the
competing goals of protecting the markets and limiting so-called abusive
litigation.
Finally, I consider whether the Reform Act's pleading standards apply to
claims pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and conclude
that, contrary to their practice before the Reform Act, courts should not apply
the new scienter-based pleading standard to the negligence and strict-liability
claims of the Securities Act. I support this argument with references to both
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the Reform Act's plain language and legislative history, and the Securities
Act's purpose. The post-Reform Act decisions considering this issue have
relied on pre-Reform Act case law without considering whether the Reform
Act changed that law, resulting in some incorrectly applying the pleading
standard to plaintiffs' claims under the Securities Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
In late December 1995, Congress voted to override1 President Clinton's
veto2 of the Reform Act.3 The Reform Act significantly changes many
provisions of the Securities Act4 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the "Exchange Act") 5 (collectively, the "Acts"). Final adoption of the
Reform Act ended a debate, which began in earnest in 1993, about whether
to reform the Acts.6 The debate now shifts to what the reforms as drafted by
Congress really mean and what the impact of the Reform Act will be. This
Article examines two of those reforms, the "heightened pleading" standard
and stay-of-discovery provisions.
Part II explores the common-law bases for the Reform Act's heightened
pleading standard, focusing on the.Ninth and Second Circuits, and presents a
new model for reviewing the complaints in these cases. Part II concludes that
in order to meet the common-law pleading standards developed by the Ninth
and Second Circuits prior to the Reform Act, plaintiffs needed access to
internal company information. Plaintiffs had met the heightened pleading
standards by engaging in discovery and then repleading their complaints.
Part III briefly discusses the motivation for reform of securities litigation
1. The Senate overrode the veto on December 22, 1995. See 141 CONG. REC. S 19,180 (daily ed.
Dec. 22, 1995). The House had voted to override the veto on December 20, 1995. See 141 CONG. REC.
H 15,223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
2. President Clinton's veto message appears at 141 CONG. REC. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20,
1995).
3. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
6. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers,
51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1018 (1996); see also Ian Ayres, Securities Litigation Reform, 51 BUS. LAW. 335,
347 (1996) [hereinafter Ayres I]; Securities Litigation, 1994: Hearings on H.R. 417 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 118
(1994) (testimony of Donald C. Langevoort, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt
Univ. School of Law) (arguing for reform) [hereinafter Langevoort Testimony]; Securities Litigation,
1994: Hearings on H.R. 417 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 145 (1994) (testimony of Arthur R. Miller, Bruce Bromley
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) (arguing reforms disproportionately and unnecessarily
disadvantage plaintiffs) [hereinafter Miller Testimony]; see also infra notes 72-125 and accompanying
text.
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and the Reform Act and its legislative history. The Reform Act is
compromise legislation resulting from several years of debate over perceived
problems with private securities litigation. The primary concern was that
plaintiffs' attorneys were filing fivolous class-action suits which, given the
extensive and expensive discovery available, forced companies to settle
meritless claims. Thus, the perception was that plaintiffs were filing suits first
and searching for claims later through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's
liberal discovery provisions.
Part IV examines the Reform Act's attempt to resolve these concerns
through the adoption of pleading standard and stay-of-discovery provisions.
Together these reforms are designed to improve the quality of initial
complaints and to prevent plaintiffs from engaging in discovery before their
complaints have passed muster. Part IV concludes that the heightened
standard for pleading scienter, in combination with the provisions of the
Reform Act's section 21D(b)--which require plaintiffs to plead with
specificity the reasons why an alleged misstatement was misleading when
made-are, in light of the common law preceding them, very restrictive
changes. Indeed, I argue that when the stay-of-discovery and pleading-
standard provisions are combined and strictly applied, they are outcome-
determinative and result in the dismissal of virtually all securities fraud
lawsuits, even those which may be meritorious.
Part IV also examines significant post-Reform Act motion-to-dismiss
opinions and concludes, consistent with this Article's interpretation of the
provisions, that, when strictly applied, the pleading standard and discovery
stay severely limit plaintiffs' ability to survive motions to dismiss. I further
conclude that despite Congress's stated intent to eliminate the differences
between the circuits' pre-Reform Act pleading standards, the provisions it
adopted are already creating the beginning of a circuit split that the Supreme
Court will need to resolve.
As a result, I argue in Part V that Congress should enact a managed-
discovery plan, which would address the problem of frivolous suits and the
resulting imbalance of power between plaintiffs and defendants through
managerial-judge provisions, but would not be as draconian in its impact on
the private-enforcement mechanisms for the Acts. Managerial-judge
legislation, with explicit managed-discovery provisions, would address the
expressed concern of defendants--extensive and expensive discovery-
without preventing the access to the internal company information that the
newly-adopted pleading standard requires at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Finally, in Part VI, I explore the application of the Reform Act's pleading
provisions to the Securities Act. Specifically, I argue that because section
21D(b) amends only the Exchange Act, it should be applied to dismiss only
[VOL. 76:537
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claims under that Act. Before the Reform Act, many circuits held that when a
complaint pleads allegations under both Acts, the complaint may "sound in
fraud," and all allegations-even those of strict liability or negligence causes
of action-must be dismissed if not pleaded with the requisite particularity
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). I argue, however, that
courts should apply the new pleading standard only to claims under the
Exchange Act and allow claims brought pursuant to the Securities Act to
survive dismissal under the more lenient standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).7 Such an approach is consistent with both the Reform
Act's language and the Securities Act's underlying policies.
II. HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARDS IN SECURITIES FRAUD CASES
A. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder8 and Rule 9(b)
The circuits were initially divided9 over whether a claim brought pursuant
to the implied cause of action available under section 10(b)10 and Rule
1Ob-5 11 of the Exchange Act (an "Exchange Act Claim")1 2 required a
7. There are eight express causes of action available pursuant to the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act. The Securities Act provisions are: § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994 & Supp. II 1996)
(creating liability for misrepresentations and omissions in registration statements); § 12, 15 U.S.C.
§ 771 (1994 & Supp. H1 1996) (creating liability for misrepresentations and omissions in public
prospectuses and for sale of unregistered securities); and § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994) (creating
liability for controlling persons). The Exchange Act provisions are: § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1994)
(creating liability for certain manipulations of securities traded on stock exchanges); § 16, 15 u.S.C.
§ 78p (1994) (providing for short-swing profit liability); § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1994) (creating
liability for misleading statements in certain periodic reports filed with SEC); § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t
(1994 & Supp. H 1996) (creating liability for controlling persons); and § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1
(1994) (creating insider-trading liability for contemporaneous traders). See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286 (1993); Gustafson v. Alloyd, 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (limiting
section 12(2) liability to misstatements and omissions in public-offering prospectuses and oral
communications).
In addition, there are four implied causes of action under the Exchange Act: § 10b, 15 u.S.C.
§ 78j (1994), and Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992) (general fraud liability provisions);
§ 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994), and Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.IL § 240.14a-9 (1992) (prohibiting fraud in
connection with proxy solicitations); § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994) and Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-3 (prohibiting fraud in connection with tender offers); and § 13(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1)
(prohibiting fraud in connection with issuer's repurchase of its own shares). See Joseph A. Grundfest,
Disimplying Private Rights ofAction Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission s Authority,
107 HARV. L. REv. 961, 964 n.3 (1994) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Grundfest I].
8. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
9. Seeid. at193 n.12.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
11. 17 C.F.R § 240.1Ob-5 (1992).
12. As noted above, there are numerous express and implied causes of action available to
plaintiffs under the Exchange Act. See supra note 7. This Article, however, focuses only on the most
prominent cause of action, the implied § 10(b)/Rule IOb-5 claims. See Grundfest I, supra note 7, at
965 (saying the "private right of action implied under Rule 1Ob-5 has become civil plaintiffs' primary
weapon in their battle against securities fraud"). This Article refers to the section 10(b)/Rule lOb-5
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plaintiff to prove scienter on the part of the defendants or simply that the
defendants had acted negligently. In 1976, however, the Supreme Court in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder held that plaintiffs must prove the defendants
acted with "scienter-[the] intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud."' 3 In
reaching this holding, the Court relied, in part, on the need to restrict the
reach of the implied cause of action.' 4 Accordingly, to state an Exchange Act
Claim, a plaintiff must plead that (1) the defendant made a misstatement or
omission (2) of a material fact (3) with scienter, and (4) that her reliance on
that misstatement or omission (5) caused her injury.' 5 Since that time, the
courts have used the scienter element, in conjunction with Rule 9(b), as a tool
to screen out inadequate complaints at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
On a motion to dismiss, securities fraud complaints, like all complaints,
are subjected to the standards imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
("Rule 8"). Under Rule 8, plaintiffs need only plead "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that [they are] entitled to relief."' 6 The
purpose of this requirement is to permit plaintiffs to set forth allegations
without requiring that every element of the claim be pleaded with specificity
or particularity. 17
Because scienter is an element of an Exchange Act Claim, however,
complaints alleging such liability are also subject to the strictures of Rule
9(b). Rule 9 sets the standard for "Pleading Special Matters," providing in
clause (b):
[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of mind of a person may be averred
generally. 1
8
Separating certain cases, or elements of those cases, from those allowed
to be pleaded "with a short plain statement of the facts,"'19 Rule 9(b) requires
that fraud claims be treated differently from those to which Rule 8 alone
cause of action as the "Exchange Act Claim."
13. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197.
14. See id. at 208.
15. See, e.g., San Leandro Emergency Med. Plan v. Philip Morris, 75 F.3d 801, 808 (2d Cir.
1996). Since the Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in 1988, plaintiffs may
plead reliance simply by alleging that they purchased the securities in the open market. See Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
16. FED. R- CIv. P. 8.
17. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1218 (2d ed. 1990).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
19. 5 WRIGHT& MILLER, supra note 17, at § 1218.
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applies.2° Plaintiffs who assert claims of fraud must do more than show the
existence of a claim. They must particularize the "circumstances" of the
alleged fraud. The standard, as adopted by various courts, therefore, affects
not only the pleading of scienter, but also the pleading of most elements of an
Exchange Act Claim.21
Before the Reform Act, advocates for reform claimed that the typical
securities fraud class-action complaint was filed immediately after a drop in
the company's stock price22 and was occasioned not by fraud, but by the
20. See id,
21. By way of comparison, consider a different cause of action, such as a gender discrimination
claim. The typical failure-to-hire case requires the plaintiff to plead her allegations in conformity only
with Rule 8. Thus, a gender-discrimination complaint need allege, in simple form, only that the
plaintiff was denied a job for which she was qualified, and for which the company hired a man, and
that the company made its decision on the basis of gender. Unlike the securities fraud context, the
gender discrimination plaintiff is allowed to plead this aspect of her complaint on the basis of
information and belief. Accordingly, under Rule 8, she need provide only a short, plain statement of
the facts entitling her to a remedy, and discovery begins.
In order to prove her claim, the plaintiff will need access to company information, which she will
obtain through discovery. For example, she can request documents pertaining to the company's
evaluations of herself and any other individuals considered for the position, depose anyone involved in
the hiring or selection process, and request company statistics concerning the numbers and genders of
persons considered or eligible for the position in question as well as other comparable positions within
the company.
All of this discovery is internal information to which the plaintiff is entitled under the Federal
Rules and to which she would not have access without discovery. Moreover, in the absence of some
direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff will need this type of internal information to prove her
case. In contrast, under both the pre- and post-Reform Act pleading standard, securities fraud plaintiffs
need access to internal information not only to prove their claims, but also to plead them. See infra
notes 40-51, 65-71, 224-30, 238-45 and accompanying text. As this Article discusses, the Reform Act
denies them that discovery.
22. See Ayres I, supra note 6, at 339 (stating that reform proponents contended that plaintiffs'
lawyers filed fraud suits without investigating claims whenever companies' stock prices fell more than
10%); see also Securities Litigation 1994: Hearing on H.R. 417 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm.
and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 217 (1994) (testimony of
Stephen F. Smith, General Counsel and Dir. of Investor Relations, Exabyte Corp.) (noting that
complaints submitted by plaintiffs' attorneys were often computer-generated boilerplates) [hereinafter
Smith Testimony]; 141 CONG. REC. S12,201-02, S12,203 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1995) (statement of Mr.
Domenici) (arguing a drop in stock price is "signal for a small group of specialized lawyers to file
class-action lawsuits alleging fraud-often within hours of drop); 141 CONG. REc. S17,965-03,
S17,968 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Mr. Domenici) (citing a National Association of
Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys study finding 21% of fraud cases were filed within 48 hours
of drop in stock price); see id. at S 17,979 (statement of Mr. Faircloth) (citing a National Law Journal
study in which 12 of 46 claims were filed within one day of drop in stock price), S 17982 (statement of
Mr. Dole) (arguing that even huge gains in stock price sometimes prompt fraud claims). But see
Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 119 (suggesting that no meaningful correlation exists between
stock-price drops and filing of fraud claims); Securities Litigation 1994: Hearing on H.R. 417 Before
the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 267
(1994) (testimony of Leonard B. Simon, attorney) (same) [hereinafter Simon Testimony]; 141 CONG.
REC. S17,933-04, S17,951 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Mr. Bryan) (citing University of
California study showing that only 3% of 589 stocks, which dropped over 20% in five days, were
sued).
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desire of the plaintiffs' counsel to extract an unwarranted settlement from
defendants. This quick response of the plaintiffs23 to market changes, in
combination with the defendants' argument that the suits lacked merit,
resulted in courts attempting to determine, at the pleading stage, whether the
alleged misstatements were actually fraudulent and, thus, when revealed as
such, caused the stock to plummet, or whether the decreased stock price was
instead due to business or economic factors.24
Courts have developed and applied a wide variety of Rule 9(b) standards
to screen complaints, focusing on the specificity of the allegations as a
measure of whether the plaintiffs appear to have a legitimate claim of fraud.25
The Second Circuit noted that these cases
present an inevitable tension between two powerful interests. On the
one hand, there is the interest in deterring fraud in the securities
markets and remedying it when it occurs. That interest is served by
recognizing that the victims of fraud often are unable to detail their
allegations until they have had some opportunity to conduct discovery
of those reasonably suspected of having perpetrated a fraud....
On the other hand, there is the interest in deterring the use of the
litigation process as a device for extracting undeserved settlements as
the price of avoiding the extensive discovery costs that frequently
ensue once a complaint survives dismissal, even though no recovery
would occur if the suit were litigated to completion.26
Through the Reform Act, Congress sought, in part, to resolve both this
tension and the differing pleading standards among the circuits.
27
23. For simplicity this Article refers to plaintiffs, but the reader should keep in mind that
plaintiffs in these cases function primarily as stakeholders; their attorneys run the litigation. See infra
note 75.
24. Because "only a fraction of financial deteriorations reflect fraud," plaintiffs must do more
than aver two different financial statements; they must point to facts to show the difference is
attributable to fraud. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).
25. See Sec. Fraud Litig.: Concerning Litig. Under the Fed. Sec. Laws before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and Fin. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 38 (1994) (statement of Arthur C.
Levitt, Chairman, SEC) (testifying that although Rule 9(b) does not normally apply to allegations
about defendants' state of mind, courts in the First, Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits required
plaintiffs to allege facts giving rise to strong inference of fraud for scienter element) [hereinafter Levitt
Testimony]. For a discussion of the standard in those and all other circuits, see infra note 33. See also
infra notes 35-71 and accompanying text.
26. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litg., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir 1993). The Time Warner court
then expressed the difficulty it faced when adjudicating such competing interests in the absence of
either statutory guidance from Congress or regulatory guidance from the SEC. Id.
27. See 141 CONG. REC. S17,933-04, S17,954 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Mr. Dodd)
(arguing conflicting pleading standards resulted from Congressional inaction); Levitt Testimony, supra
note 25 (noting circuit split and arguing that harmonizing standards would be beneficial).
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B. Applying Rule 9(b) to Securities-Fraud Complaints
Because the circuits, and the courts within them, analyze Exchange Act
Claims differently, it is useful to have a model to compare how the courts are
actually applying Rule 9(b) to determine whether to dismiss a complaint. In
DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, the Seventh Circuit addressed the question of
pleading with particularity and applied Rule 9(b) to hold that investors
making an Exchange Act Claim must distinguish themselves from others
who were simply adversely affected by "business reverses." 28 The court
stated that plaintiffs could meet this standard in the following manner:
"Although states of mind may be pleaded generally, the 'circumstances'
must be pleaded in detail. This means the who, what, when, where, and how:
the first paragraph of any newspaper story."
29
An adaptation of this holding, which considers whether the plaintiffs have
pleaded the who, what, when, where, why, and how of the alleged fraud,
provides a model for gaining insight into the approach different circuits use
to review such complaints. Courts generally agree that Rule 9(b) requires
plaintiffs to allege with particularity the following: who made the alleged
misstatement or omission; what she said; when she said it; and where she
said it.30 The purpose of these criteria is relatively straightforward: "to give
notice of plaintiff's claim of fraud and to inform each individual defendant of
what role he is alleged to have played in the fraud.",31 The courts, however,
disagree about the last two elements-whether plaintiffs must plead with
particularity facts showing why an alleged misstatement was misleading or
false when made, and how the defendants then knew or should have known
that it was misleading.32
28. Dileo, 901 F.2d at 629; see also Colby v. Hologic, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 204, 206 (D. Mass.
1993) (saying the case presented "the grimly familiar picture of disappointed investors crying fraud
after fortunes were lost when a promising corporation stumbled in the winds of New England's
lingering economic winter").
29. Dileo, 901 F.2d at 627. Since deciding DiLeo, the Seventh Circuit has further heightened its
pleading standard to require greater particularity. See infra note 33.
30. See, e.g., Hekker v. Ideon Group, Inc., No. 95-681-Civ-J-16, 1996 WL 578335, at *6 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 18, 1996) (noting that in addition to specifying alleged misstatements, the "complaint
specifically plead[ed] the who, when and where of the alleged fraud").
31. Konstantinakos v. FDIC, 719 F. Supp. 35,38 (D. Mass. 1989).
32. For example, the First Cireuit requires plaintiffs to plead both the why and the how elements
with specificity. See, e.g., Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357 (1st Cir. 1994)
(requiring that plaintiffs plead with particularity both facts to show that alleged misstatement was
misleading when made and facts surrounding scienter). The Ninth Circuit focuses on the why element.
See, e.g., In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547-49 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring plaintiffs to
plead with particularity facts showing alleged misstatement was misleading when made, but plaintiffs
may aver scienter generally).
Courts within the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits focus, only on
the how elements. See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory See. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997)
1998]
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An analysis of cases from the Ninth and Second Circuits reveals how the
application of the how and why factors affects Exchange Act complaints.
These two courts have extensively reviewed securities fraud matters, and,
prior to the Reform Act, each applied Rule 9(b) to such cases in a way that
highlights the distinction between the two factors. The Ninth Circuit focused
on what this Article refers to as the falsity, or "why" element; the Second
focused on the scienter, or "how" element.33
1. The Ninth Circuit's Pre-Reform Act Analysis of Particularized
Pleading
In the 1994 case, In re GlenFed, Inc. Securities Litigation,34 the Ninth
(adopting Second Circuit standard by holding plaintiff must plead scienter either by alleging
defendants had motive and opportunity to commit fraud or acted with conscious or reckless behavior);
Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1278-79 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding, in context of
allegedly false projections, that plaintiffs must plead facts to show that company lacked reasonable
basis or issued alleged misstatement in less than good faith); Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp.,
14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding plaintiff must set forth facts from which scienter may be
inferred); In re Time Wamer, Inc. See. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269-71 (2d. Cir. 1993) (focusing on scienter
allegations and requiring particularity in pleading such allegations); Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456,
1468 (7th Cir. 1993) (requiring pleading of facts from which scienter may be inferred); Buffets, Inc.
Sec. Litig. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,210 at 95,061-62 (D. Minn. Nov.
22, 1995) (noting that Eighth Circuit had not decided pleading issue; finding that in order to defeat
dismissal, complaint must set forth facts "explaining why it is claimed that the representations were
known by each of the Defendants to be untrue or misleading when they were made"); Borow v. nView
Corp., 829 F. Supp 828, 833, 836 (E.D. Va. 1993) (finding that to meet Rule 9(6) standard, plaintiffs
must allege "provable facts" tending to show that when alleged misstatements were made, they were
not actually or reasonably believed).
Other circuit and district courts have found that neither element must be pleaded with specificity.
See, e.g., Auslender v. Energy Management Corp., 832 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1987) (reversing dismissal
of claim for failure to plead with particularity, holding sufficient minimal allegation that defendants
knew or were reckless in not knowing certain facts were false); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Carlstedt,
800 F.2d 1008 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (holding plaintiffs need only identify who, what, where,
and when of alleged fraud; Rule 9(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8); Hekker, 1996 WL
578335, at *6 (noting Eleventh Circuit had not decided whether scienter had to be pleaded with
particularity, then finding sufficient general allegations that defendants knew "true" facts or acted with
reckless disregard for truth when making allegedly misleading statements).
33. Compare GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1547 (stating that under Rule 9(b) plaintiffs must plead with
specificity allegations to show why an alleged misstatement or omission was false when made, but
need not plead scienter allegations with particularity), with Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d
1124 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiffs must plead circumstances surrounding knowledge or
recklessness with specificity).
Arguably, the Reform Act pleading standard adopts part of each circuit's analysis of Rule 9(b).
See infra Part IV; see also William S. Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under Section
21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness, and the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 901-13 (1996) (arguing that
Reform Act adopted both Ninth and Second Circuit's pleading standards).
34. 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (reversing prior opinion in same matter which held
Rule 9(h) imposed particularity requirement for scienter element).
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Circuit reevaluated its prior approach to securities fraud claims, reviewed the
actual text of Rule 9(b), and rejected the Second Circuit's scienter approach
as beyond the language of the Rule's second sentence.35 Reasoning that the
language of Rule 9(b) plainly states that the circumstances surrounding the
alleged fraud, but not the state of mind connected with it, must be pleaded
with particularity, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs had to plead the
circumstances surrounding the alleged fraud (the who, what, where, when,
and why) with particularity, 36 but could aver the how element simply by
"saying that scienter existed."37 Thus, the Ninth Circuit distinguished facts
indicating whether an alleged misstatement was false or misleading when
made from the defendants' knowledge of those facts.38
In practice, this standard usually required plaintiffs to have access to
internal company information and documents. For example, the Ninth Circuit
stated that its Rule 9(b) standard required plaintiffs to plead with particularity
"contemporaneous facts, conditions, or statements" that tended to show the
alleged misstatement was misleading when made.39 An examination of In re
GlenFed reveals the plaintiffs met this standard, in part, by contrasting
GlenFed's September 30, 1990 10-Q statement that it "expected no net loss
on the sale of its subsidiaries" with contemporaneous statements from board
meetings indicating (1) the environment for the sale of a subsidiary real
estate development company was unfavorable, (2) interest in buying that
subsidiary was limited, and (3) all bids were unsatisfactory.40 The court held
that these three allegations of contemporaneous internal information, which
appeared to contradict GlenFed's public 10-Q statement, were sufficient to
allow the alleged misstatement to withstand dismissal.41
Of key importance to the court's analysis was the plaintiffs' reliance on
internal company information to support the argument that the complaint
35. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
36. The Ninth Circuit's approach appears to be consistent with the Seventh Circuit's statement in
DiLeo v. Ernest & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990). Despite the actual language of DiLeo,
the Seventh Circuit requires plaintiffs to plead facts to support the scienter element of their claim. See,
e.g., Arazie, 2 F.3d at 1466-67 (dismissing complaint where plaintiffs failed to plead with particularity
facts supporting their allegations that defendants knew or should have known of alleged problems
before public announcements).
37. GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1547.
38. See id. at 1546-47.
39. See, e.g., Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1083-84; May v. Borick, No. CV 95-8407 LGB
(EX), 1997 WL 314166 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 1997) (dismissing complaint where plaintiffs failed to plead
inconsistent contemporaneous statements or information).
40. GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1550.
41. See id. The court noted, however, that other statements in the record appeared to contradict
the internal statements to which the plaintiffs pointed. See id. It then stated that "whether or not, in
light of contemporaneous statements which appear to conflict with one another, the charged statement
was in fact materially misleading"' was a question appropriate for either summary judgment or a
motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Id.
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should survive Rule 9(b). For example, in support of other alleged
misstatements, the plaintiffs pointed to, and the court considered, other
internal documents, including "non-public" audit documents that
corroborated allegations that GlenFed lacked control over, or failed to
monitor, certain loans and outdated appraisals of the collateral securing its
loans.42 These contemporaneous internal statements and documents, the court
held, showed that the plaintiffs had gone beyond merely pleading that the
"defendants' public statements were false, without explaining [why] they
were false.'" 3 Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs met the requisite
standard by pointing to specific internal problems or statements that
contradicted the allegedly misleading public statements."
In contrast, the court dismissed other allegations, specifically noting that
the plaintiffs had failed to juxtapose the alleged misstatements with
explanations of which
internal controls [were] missing, why the information defendants
purportedly used as a basis for their optimistic statements was
unreliable, or what information within GlenFed revealed that
foreclosures and defaults were increasing[,] ... nor which 'specific
loss situations' the defendants were concealing[,] ... or the number of
non-performing assets (NPA).45
For example, the court held "patently insufficient" allegations that internal
controls were missing. 6 Instead, the court noted that the reasons cited by the
plaintiffs to support their allegations of fraud both had to be
contemporaneous in nature and have a nexus to the alleged misstatement.47
This standard required plaintiffs to plead, for example, two
contemporaneous public statements which contradicted each other or to
juxtapose the company's public statement with conflicting non-public
information. Because the former situation is unlikely to occur,48 the court's
holding implicitly required plaintiffs to point to internal documents or
42. Seeid. at 1550-51.
43. Id. at 1551.
44. The Ninth Circuit's internal-information requirement for pleading the why aspect of the
alleged fraud often resembles one of the Second Circuit's tests for pleading the how of the alleged
fraud. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
45. GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1552 (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. But see Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or
Road Block?, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 675, 705 (1996) (stating that plaintiffs should be able to meet pleading
standards through use of"information superhighway").
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information to survive dismissal.49 In the absence of a whistle-blower or
disgruntled former employee, however, such information is available only
through discovery. Prior to the Reform Act, plaintiffs met this standard
because they were able to begin discovery shortly after filing their first
complaint and continue it throughout several versions of the complaint and
motions to dismissi °
2. The Second Circuit's Approach to Particularized Pleading
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's pleading standard, the Second Circuit
developed a Rule 9(b) pleading standard which focused primarily on the
requisite mental state of the defendants, thereby contravening the second
sentence of the Rule.5 1 The Second Circuit required that "the facts alleged in
the complaint give rise to a 'strong inference' of fraudulent intent. ' 52 In the
absence of direct evidence of fraud, the Second Circuit delineated two ways
in which the plaintiffs could meet its pleading requirement for the scienter
element 5 3 First, the plaintiffs could allege facts establishing a motive to
commit fraud and the opportunity to do so.5 4 Second, the plaintiffs could
allege facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either recklessness or
conscious behavior.55 The Second Circuit defined motive to "entail concrete
49. Consider also Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1995), where the court
denied a motion to dismiss based on internal information pleaded in the complaint because allegations
that the company's public statements were undermined by specific sales figures pleaded on a
store-by-store basis allowed the complaint to meet the requisite specificity. Again, the court relied on
internal company information when denying the motion to dismiss. See also Pilarczyk v. Morrison
Knudsen Corp., 965 F. Supp. 311 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (dismissing post-Reform Act complaint where
plaintiffs failed to identify who knew of internal information when).
50. See, e.g., O'Rear v. American Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus, 784 F. Supp. 1561
(M.D. Fla. 1992) (ruling on a motion to dismiss third amended complaint); Motions to Dismiss and
Complaints, In re Copley Pharmaceutical [on file with author). The Reform Act, however, stays all
discovery until after resolution of the motion to dismiss. See infra notes 238-45 and accompanying
text; see also Medhekar v. U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, 99 F.3d 325 (9th Cir.
1996) (reversing the District Court and holding that section 21D(b)(3)(B) stays all discovery, including
FED. R- CIv. P. 26 automatic disclosures).
51. See, e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that
Rule 9(b) should be strictly applied); Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978). One recent
Second Circuit decision appears to hold that plaintiffs must plead both the why and the how elements.
See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Co., Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801,
812 (2d Cir. 1996). This case was decided after the Ninth Circuit's 1995 decision In re GlenFed, Inc.
Securities Litigation, 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Salinger v. Projectavision, Inc., 972 F.
Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding plaintiffs failed to plead either element with specificity).
52. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations and quotations
omitted).
53. See id. at 268-69; see also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1129-30 (2d Cir.
1994).
54. See Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130.
55. See Glickman v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., No. 93 CIV. 7594 (LAP), 1996 WL
88570 (S.D.N.Y February 27, 1996).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
benefits that could be realized by one or more of the false statements and
wrongful nondisclosures alleged," and opportunity to "entail the means and
likely prospect of achieving concrete benefits by the means alleged. 56
In determining whether the scienter allegations in a complaint met the
motive-and-opportunity test, the Second Circuit, and the district courts within
it, generally found sufficient allegations of trades by insiders in suspicious
amounts or at suspicious times.57 The information necessary to establish such
trades is available in publicly filed forms from officers and directors.58 Thus,
the Second Circuit has held that such trades allowed it to draw an inference
that the defendants acted with the requisite state of mind. Accordingly, prior
to the Reform Act, plaintiffs in the Second Circuit could, at the pleading
stage, use allegations of motive and opportunity to support a claim of
scienter, thereby surviving dismissal on the basis of publicly-available
information.
In contrast, courts within the Second Circuit usually rejected plaintiffs'
attempts to support scienter claims by pleading motives that were applicable
to any similarly-situated company. For example, the courts rejected the
following types of allegations as inadequate to establish scienter: preserving
good relations with suppliers, encouraging retailers to place orders,
forestalling loan defaults, or protecting executive positions;59 ensuring
incentive compensation; 60 maintaining a company's high bond rating;61 and
raising capital, protecting the company's financial interests, or preventing the
56. Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130.
57. See, e.g., Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that defendants
profited from allegedly bullish statements by selling significant number of shares of stock); see also
Jordan Eth & Michael Dicke, Insider Stock Sales in Rule lOb-5 Corporate Disclosure Cases:
Separating the Innocent from the Suspicious, 1 STAN. J. L., BUS. & FIN. 97 (1994); Vanessa
O'Connell, Lavyers Scan Insider Sales to Build Suits, WALL STREET J., June 5, 1996, at C1. Indeed,
such allegations support an inference of scienter in every circuit requiring that scienter be pleaded with
particularity. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1224 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding
allegations of insider trades in suspicious amounts or at suspicious times permit an inference of
scienter); Buffets, Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 199,210 at
95,062 (D. Minn. May 17, 1996) (concluding that, although insider trades alone are insufficient to
allege scienter, suspicious timing or amounts or unusual trades will meet pleading standard); cf Acito
v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding inside sales by outside director not
sufficient where they were disclosed in advance, were not unusual in amount or timing, and no other
defendants sold at same time).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1994) (requiring officers and directors to file forms describing
changes in beneficial ownership on monthly basis); HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW 611
(1966) (noting that SEC issues press releases containing summaries of such trading).
59. See In re Crystal Brands Sec. Litig., 862 F. Supp. 745, 749 (D. Conn. 1994).
60. See Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 785 F. Supp. 1101, 1107 (D. Conn. 1991).
61. See Stepak v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., No. H:90CV00886(AVC), 1994 WL 858045, at *16
n.29 (D. Conn. August 29, 1994), affd, 52 F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 1995) (table).
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termination of an officer.62 Thus, motives typical of businesses or business
people in general did not meet the Second Circuit's requirement for pleading
the defendants' state of mind.6 3
Plaintiffs could also meet the Second Circuit's scienter standard by
pleading facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either recklessness or
conscious behavior.64 In application, this test was similar to the Ninth
Circuit's standard for pleading the falsity of the misrepresentations, but
required plaintiffs to plead contemporaneous facts, conditions, or statements
to show that defendants knew or should have known that an alleged
misstatement was misleading when made.65 In practice, this standard also
usually required the plaintiffs to make allegations based on internal company
information. The difference was one primarily of focus: the Second Circuit
examined such information in the context of the how element, and the Ninth
in the context of the why element. For example, in Shields v. Citytrust
Bancorp, Inc.,66 the Second Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' allegations,
holding insufficient the plaintiffs' attempts to pair alleged misstatements with
67totecutth
conclusory allegations of fraudulent intent. According to the court, the
plaintiffs should have contrasted the alleged misstatements with
contemporaneous internal loan-loss reserve reports.68 Further, the court
specifically noted that companies were allowed to make optimistic
statements about their future unless the "current data" before the officers and
directors indicated otherwise.69 In this manner, the Second Circuit's
recklessness analysis, like the Ninth Circuit's why approach, implicitly
forced plaintiffs to make allegations based on information they were likely to
find only through discovery.
62. See Glickman v. Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc., No. 93 CIV. 7594 (LAP), 1996 WL
88570 (S.D.N.Y. February 27, 1996).
63. See id.
64. See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d
801 (2d Cir. 1996) (where plaintiffs seek to plead scienter through recklessness, their circumstantial
allegations must meet a higher standard of detail than those under motive test); see also Gliclanan,
[Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 94,640.
65. See, e.g., Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1129 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting as
insufficient allegations that did not contrast public disclosures with current internal data); see also
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
66. 25 F.3d 1124 (2dCir. 1994).
67. See id.at 1129.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 1129-30.
70. See also Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357, 365 (1st Cir. 1994)
(rejecting, in part, a defense motion to dismiss which specifically referred to internal reports and public
statements plaintiffs cited as support for their claims). Again, the Reform Act eliminated such
discovery while motions to dismiss are pending. See infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text.
Not all of the cases can be explained by the internal/external standard described in this Article.
However, many of the opinions that deny motions to dismiss without requiring the plaintiffs to point to
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III. THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE REFORM ACT AND ITS HEIGHTENED
PLEADING STANDARD
During the early 1990s, momentum for revisions to the Acts began to
build.71 Those calling for reform cited many bases for their claim that the
private enforcement mechanism for securities regulation was broken.72 In
general, the debate focused on two major points. First, according to industry
groups, the transaction cost of filing such suits was minimal,73 allowing
corroborating internal information have unique publicly-available facts. For example, in Cosmos v.
Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1989), the plaintiffs alleged that the chief executive officer made
positive statements about anticipated sales to China at a time when China had recently imposed import
restrictions. The court held that such allegations "support[ed] an inference of fraud by pleading
adequate circumstantial evidence to indicate conscious misconduct by the defendants-i.e., that the
defendants knew of the import restrictions at the time they made the allegedly fraudulent statements."
See id. In another Second Circuit case, public allegations of bribes made to "secure foreign business or
business concessions" permitted the plaintiffs to withstand, in part, a motion to dismiss. Decker v.
Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1982); see also City of Painesville, Ohio v.
First Montauk Fin., Corp., 178 F.R.D. 180, 185-89 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (finding complaint met
heightened pleading standard, but noting that company had previously disclosed existence of
Securities and Exchange Commission investigation and indictments in Florida).
Plaintiffs also succeed in meeting the pleading standard when the case involves a highly-regulated
industry, in which certain information is either public or in which the regulated nature of the industry
puts a higher burden on officers and directors. See In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 1998 WL 276177,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1998) (noting that as officers of highly-regulated company, defendants
should have been aware of the normal time period for issuance of gambling license and reasons for
non-issuance and that pleadings indicated that defendants appeared to have known that issuance was in
question before making information public). An additional category of cases in which plaintiffs
succeed in meeting the pleading standard without access to internal information are those in which the
alleged misstatement and correction appear in close proximity to each other. See, e.g., In re
Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1112 (D. Nev. 1998) (noting that "shortness in
time" between prior statement and "later revealed truth" can serve as circumstantial evidence that
alleged misstatement was false or misleading when made).
71. See Attitude Sh if Acknowledging Abuses in Shareholder Litigation Seen at SEC, 26 Rep.
(BNA) No. 26, at 937 (July 1, 1994) (discussing shift in SEC's attitude toward securities litigation
reform; noting reform was one of "hottest topics on [SEC's] agenda") [hereinafter Attitude Shift].
72. See Grundfest , supra note 7, at 971-75. The main focus of Grundfest's article is that the
SEC has the power to disimply the private right of action for section 10(b)/Rule lob-5 claims and
should exercise it. See id. at 998-1022. He also discusses and analyzes the arguments underlying the
demands for reform of the private securities litigation laws. See id. at 971-75. Also summarizing the
reform debate are Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994) (arguing that
although SEC may have prospective power to disimply such private right, private enforcement of
securities laws is important to integrity of market and evidence offered by proponents of reform is
insufficient to support their case); Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727
(1995) (responding to Seligman's article; arguing that evidence indeed supported some reforms and
urging SEC to explore such reforms) [hereinafter Grundfest II]; Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at
1010-15; Report to the President and the Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, at 5-9 (April,
1997).
73. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1011-12, 1014.
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plaintiffs (in reality, plaintiffs' attorneys)74 to file class-actions quickly and
easily, 75 often the day after a company's stock price dropped. 76 This ease in
filing, they claimed, was resulting in strike suits.7 7 In fact, reform proponents
argued that allegations in the complaints often amounted only to claims of
"fraud by hindsight, 78 which plaintiffs later supported through the liberal
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.79 Thus,
according to reform advocates, plaintiffs engaged in a file-first-and-research-
the-complaint-later strategy.
This power to conduct wide-ranging discovery, industry representatives
argued, caused another problem, an imbalance of power between plaintiffs
and defendants that allowed plaintiffs to extract settlements from
defendants--even in matters lacking merit.80 In essence, the argument was
74. Much of the debate focused on the allegedly inappropriate practices of plaintiffs' counsel.
For example, proponents of reform argued that plaintiffs' attorneys hired professional plaintiffs to be
class representatives, raced to the courthouse to secure their position as lead counsel, and included law
and accounting firms as defendants to increase settlement value. These tactics, reform proponents
claimed, resulted in plaintiffs' attorneys, not class members, dictating the pace and merits of litigation.
See id. at 1009-10 (noting that plaintiffs' attorneys "rushed" to courthouse to file complaints, citing
example computer-generated complaint that failed to update allegations from previous lawsuit); 141
CONG. REc. S 12,201-02, S 12,203 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1995) (statement of Mr. Domenici) (quoting
"prominent securities class-action attorney" as stating, "I have the greatest practice of law in the world,
I have no clients."); 141 CONG. REC. S17,933-04, S17,933-04 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of
Mr. D'Amato) (noting same plaintiff appeared in thirteen lawsuits and that plaintiffs often own as few
as ten shares of stock in company sued); 141 CONG. REC. S17,965-03, S17,969 (daily ed. Dec. 5,
1995) (statement of Mr. Domenici) (arguing lack of plaintiff participation results in plaintiffs'
attorneys recovering "lion's share" of settlement); id. at S 17,979 (statement of Mr. Faircloth) (arguing
average investor receives six to seven cents of every dollar recovered); see id. at S 17,982 (statement of
Mr. Frist) (arguing plaintiffs' attorneys' incentive is quick settlement and trial avoidance, creating
conflict of interest with investors). As stated supra in note 23, for simplicity this Article refers to
plaintiffs.
75. See Smith Testimony, supra note 22, at 219 (arguing that combination of class-action,
contingent-fee, and fraud-on-the-market doctrines contributes to plaintiffs' counsel's ease in filing
such suits).
76. See supra note 22.
77. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1011-12.
78. Courts use the term "fraud by hindsight" to refer to allegations usually found insufficient to
survive motions to dismiss. Such a claim usually "rests upon the assumption that the defendants must
have known about the severity of [the current problem causing the stock price decrease] earlier
because conditions became so bad later on." Serabian v. Amoskeag BankShares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357,
367 (Ist Cir. 1994).
79. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1014 (noting that plaintiffs "blanketed" defendants
with discovery demands before rulings on motions to dismiss); see also H.R. CON. REP. No. 104-369,
at 37 (referring to discovery in such class actions as "fishing expeditions"); 141 CONG. REc. S17,933-
04, S17,933 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Mr. D'Amato) (stating that one company was
forced to produce 1500 boxes of documents for discovery at a cost of$1.4 million). This "file first and
discover later" approach allowed courts to adopt the above-described internal-information pleading
standard. See supra notes 40-51, 65-71 and accompanying text.
80. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1012-14; see also Grundfest I, supra note 7, at 973-74;
Konstantinakos v. FDIC, 719 F. Supp. 35, 38 (D. Mass. 1989) (noting high "strike suit" value of
securities fraud claims); Smith Testimony, supra note 22, at 219 (arguing discovery imbalance
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that plaintiffs were able to serve discovery requests, and defendants had to
comply, regardless of whether the suit had merit.
The discovery requests were broad.81 For example, discovery demands
often included requests for everything from minutes and documents relating
to board meetings to every sales contract entered into by the company.
82
Moreover, reform proponents argued, those same document requests covered
periods of time not even at issue in the lawsuit.83 In addition to the
production of documents, discovery in these cases usually involved
depositions, lasting several days, of chief executive officers, presidents, chief
financial officers, members of the board of directors, and other employees.
The number of depositions often exceeded the number of depositions to
which plaintiffs were entitled under local Federal District Court Rules.8 4 This
discovery began shortly after the plaintiffs filed the complaint and continued
throughout the entire motion-to-dismiss period.85
Further, reform proponents contended, courts took months, sometimes
even years, before hearing arguments and issuing opinions on motions to
dismiss.8 6 The opinions, in turn, usually granted plaintiffs leave to replead
their complaints, often several times, before dismissing the complaint with
prejudice. This process, industry advocates complained, made winning an
initial motion to dismiss nothing more than a Pyrrhic victory.87 Defendants
protested that they were subjected to lengthy and expensive discovery
procedures, the costs of multiple motions to dismiss, and an uncertain
outcome.88 Indeed, they said that this abuse of the discovery process often led
to settlement-even of frivolous cases.89 Thus, they argued, plaintiffs'
provides plaintiffs with economic leverage); see also Levitt Testimony, supra note 25, at 36 (testifying
that incentive structure allows plaintiffs to settle meritless cases).
81. See 141 CONG. REC. S12,201-02, S12,202 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1995) (statement of Mr.
Domenici) (claiming plaintiffs' attorneys typically "request an extensive list of documents and ...
schedule an ambitious agenda of sworn testimony").
82. See, e.g., In re Dataware Sec. Litig., Plaintiffs' First Request For Production of Documents
(on file with author); see also Phillips and Miller, supra note 6, at 1014.
83. See, e.g., In re Dataware See. Litig., Plaintiffs' First Request For Production of Documents
(including requests for the time period of December 31, 1992 to July 31, 1994 for a class period which
extended only from July 20, 1993 to December 8, 1993) (on file with author).
84. See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS FED. R. CT. 26.1(c) (limiting depositions to ten per party); IDAHO
R. CT. 30.1 (creating ten-deposition presumption).
85. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1014.
86. See In re Bay Financial Sec. Litig., Order Denying Motion to Dismiss [on file with author].
87. See, e.g., O'Rear v. American Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus, Inc., 784 F. Supp.
1561 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (ruling on third amended complaint after threatening plaintiff with sanctions in
decision on second amended complaint).
88. See Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 628 (1st Cir. 1996) (reporting judges
were "mindful that the case comes to us after over three years of litigation and full discovery").
89. See Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 120 (noting that discovery costs create pressure
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attorneys were able to make profits on cases where no fraud was present.90
Second, those pressing for reform argued that start-up companies,
primarily emerging high-technology companies, were hardest hit by strike
suits.91 These companies, reformers contended, were sued at a higher rate
than other companies, not because they were actually committing fraud, but
because they were risky enterprises subject to fluctuations in sales and
revenues and, therefore, volatile stock prices.92 As a result, according to their
advocates, companies were often sued for what was actually a downturn in
the economy. And again, given the wide-ranging and expensive discovery
allowed, those same advocates argued that companies were forced to settle
meritless cases.
93
The courts also expressed frustration with the system and urged reform.
For example, in 1993, the Second Circuit opined that given the complex
nature of these cases, the "judicial system [was] not well suited to the
formulation of a universal resolution of the tensions" between the competing
interests of deterring fraud and the use of securities litigation to extract
on defendants to settle, often prematurely); 141 CONG. REC. S12,201-02, S12,205 (daily ed. Aug. 10,
1995) (statement of Mr. Domenici) (calling current discovery rules "legalized extortion"); see also 141
CONG. REC. S17,933-04, S 17,955 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery
as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636-37 (1989) (commenting on discovery abuse and its impact on
settlement).
90. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1014 (stating that plaintiffs' counsels were able to
achieve settlements which compensated them "handsomely," irrespective of merit in underlying
claims).
91. See id. at 1012-13; see also Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation
Reform: First Year's Experience, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, SECURITIES REGULATION 1997, at
955 (1997) (noting that high technology companies were "among the most vocal proponents" of
reform and were involved in a disproportionate number of pre-Reform Act suits); Securities Litigation:
Hearings on the Impact of Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver on Securities
Law Enforcement and Litig. Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 66 (1994) (statement of Stuart J. Kaswell, senior vice
president and general counsel, Securities Industries Association) (noting that young, high-tech firms
are most common targets of securities-fraud litigation) [hereinafter Kaswell Testimony]; 141 CONG.
REC. S17,965-03, S17,971 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (claiming that 53% of firms in Silicon Valley had
been named as defendants in securities suits); see id. at S17,972 (citing American Electric
Association's claim that every one of top ten Silicon Valley companies had been sued for fraud).
92. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1013; see also Grundfest II, supra note 73, at 735;
Smith Testimony, supra note 22, at 220; 141 CONG. REC. S12,201-02, S12,205 (daily ed. Aug. 10,
1995) (quoting Ed McCracken, The New Threat to High-Tech Firms, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
June 28, 1995 (arguing research and development risks make stock prices of high-technology firms
especially volatile); see id. at S12,206 (quoting Robert G. Gilbertson, Yes: Bill WouldProtect Growing
Companies, HARTFORD COURANT, July 13, 1995 (arguing sharp revenue and earnings jumps are the
cause of volatility in high-technology stocks); 141 CONG. REC. S17,965-03, S17,971 (daily ed. Dec. 5,
1995) (Exhibit 2, letter from the American Electric Association) (stating that rapid product
development results in stock volatility).
93. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1014-15; see also Langevoort Testimony, supra note
6, at 120; Easterbrook, supra note 90.
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unwarranted settlements.94 The court further noted that
[i]n the absence of a more refined statutory standard than the vague
contours of section 10(b) or a more detailed attempt at rulemaking
than the SEC has managed in Rule lOb-5, despite 50 years of
unavailed opportunity, courts must adjudicate the precise cases before
them, striking the balance as best they can.95
According to the court, the lack of reform had serious consequences,
including that any standard applied would produce inconsistent outcomes,
which would, in turn, create uncertainty in both the securities industry and
litigation.96 The court further noted that regardless of its attempt carefully to
delineate between real and frivolous claims of fraud, any dismissal of an
Exchange Act Claim would create the "opportunity for unremedied fraud,"
and any ruling permitting such a claim to proceed would create an
"opportunity to extract an undeserved settlement."97 As "unattractive as these
prospects [were]," it concluded, neither provided a "sound basis" for, nor
permitted "avoidance of, decision."
98
Congress became convinced that these perceived fiivolous lawsuits were
discrediting the integrity of the market and the enforcement system and,
therefore, that the class-action mechanism was in need of repair.99
Accordingly, it began to consider proposals for reform.'l 0 In early 1995, the
reform effort became part of Congress's Contract With America and focused
on the "Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995" in the House'0 ' and a
94. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259,263 (2d Cir. 1993).
95. Id. at 263-64.
96. See id. at 264.
97. Id. at 264.
98. Id.; see also Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189
(1994) (stating that "litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree
and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general").
99. See Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIz. L. REV.
717 (1996) (discussing legislative history of Reform Act).
100. See id.; see also Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1013. The first legislation to gain support
was filed in 1990 by Representative Wyden (D-Or.). See Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1062 n.31;
see also H.R. 417, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (legislation filed by Representative Tunzin (D-La.). It
was quickly followed by a proposal from Senator Dodd (D-Conn.)). See S. 1976, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994). These bills were "relatively moderate," focusing primarily on providing relief for defendants
"only peripherally involved in alleged frauds" and preserving the class-action "device for injured
investors." Barbara Moses, Securities Litigation Reformed?, 29 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG., 37,
38 (1996). Both bills died in committee. See id.
The early impetus for change came from the accounting industry and focused on limiting the
liability of accountants in securities fraud matters. The Reform Act addressed those concerns through
other provisions not discussed in this Article. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. H 1996); Reform Act, Title
III. For a description of those provisions, see Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1062-64.
101. SeeH.R. 10, 104thCong., IstSess. (1995).
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proposal10 2 of Senator Dodd and his co-sponsor, Senator Domenici, in the
Senate.
0 3
In addition to many other reforms, the Senate bill contained language
modeled on the scienter pleading standard used by the Second Circuit and
designed to force plaintiffs in all circuits to research their complaints
carefully before filing and, thereby, increase the transaction costs of filing
such suits. The language provided that, in order to survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint alleging fraud under the Exchange Act had to establish a
strong inference of scienter by (1) alleging facts sufficient to show that the
defendant had both the motive and the opportunity to commit fraud, or (2)
alleging facts that constituted strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant.10 4 Thus, the initial Senate
reform effectively defined the level of pleading required for scienter
allegations, and therefore, Exchange Act Claims, to survive a motion to
dismiss.
Both the House and the Senate voted to pass the bills and, in November
1995, the conferees met to reconcile their differences. 0 5 The Conference
Committee agreed upon a final form of the bill, based primarily upon the
Senate version, and prepared a Conference Committee Report (the
"Conference Report"), which was accompanied by an explanation titled the
Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference-Statement of
Managers-"Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995" (the "Joint
Statement"). 0 6 The Conference Report deleted the above-described language
defining the required state of mind to be pleaded for scienter. Instead, section
21D of the Conference Report amends the Exchange Act as follows:
(b) REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS.-
(1) MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS.-In any
private action arising under this title in which the plaintiff alleges
that the defendant-
(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances in which they were
made, not misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading,
102. See S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
103. See Ayres I, supra note 6, at 350. After hearings and amendments, both bills were reported
out of committee and sent to the floor for debate and votes. See id.
104. See S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
105. See id.
106. See 141 CONG. REC. H13,692, H13,699 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995).
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and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all
facts on which that belief is formed.
(2) REQUIRED STATE OF MIND.-In any private action arising
under this title in which the plaintiff may recover money damages
only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of
mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission
alleged to violate this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind.
(3) MOTION TO DISMISS; STAY OF DISCOVERY.-
(A) DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO MEET PLEADING
REQUIREMENTS.-
In any private action arising under this title, the court shall, on
the motion of any defendant, dismiss the complaint if the
requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) are not met.
(B) STAY OF DISCOVERY.-In any private action arising under
this title, all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed
during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court
finds upon the motion of any party that particularized discovery is
necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to
that party.
10 7
Despite its heading, section 21D(b)(2) does not actually define the mental
state required for scienter or even the level of pleading necessary to survive a
motion to dismiss; it provides only that the courts should apply a heightened
pleading standard to complaints brought pursuant to the Exchange Act.
Moreover, section 21D(b)(3) eliminates the discovery previously available to
plaintiffs.
107. Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 746-47 (1995). Section 21D(b) contains
additional provisions to ensure that parties preserve information subject to discovery. Those provisions
state:
(C) PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE.
(i) IN GENERAL.-During the pendency of any stay of discovery pursuant to this paragraph,
unless otherwise ordered by the court, any party to the action with actual notice of the allegations
contained in the complaint shall treat all documents, data compilations (including electronically
recorded or stored data), and tangible objects that are in the custody or control of such person and
that are relevant to the allegations, as if they were the subject of a continuing request for
production of documents from an opposing party under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(ii) SANCTION FOR WILLFUL VIOLATION.- A party aggrieved by the willful failure of an
opposing party to comply with clause (i) may apply to the court for an order awarding appropriate
sanctions.
Id. For similar stay-of-discovery provisions adopted for Securities Act matters, see 109 Stat. at 749.
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The Joint Statement discussion regarding these changes has created
uncertainty among the courts sufficient to signal the beginning of what is
likely to be a circuit split as to the meaning of the reforms. 08 The Joint
Statement first says that the Conference Committee based the language on
the Second Circuit's pleading standard and that the changes were written
specifically to conform to Rule 9(b)'s notion of pleading with
"particularity." t 9 The Joint Statement then notes that the Second Circuit
standard requires plaintiffs to state facts with particularity which give "rise to
a 'strong inference' of the defendant's fraudulent intent."' 0 Immediately
thereafter, the following language appears: "Because the Conference
Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not
intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading
standard.""' This sentence is followed by a footnote ("Footnote 23") which
states that: "For this reason, the Conference Report chose [sic] not to include
in the pleading standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or
recklessness."' " 2 Thus, the Joint Statement indicates that the Conference
Committee did not define the relevant state of mind and, arguably,
encourages courts to define the level of pleading for scienter more rigorously
than the Second Circuit had prior to the adoption of the Reform Act." 
3
Both the Senate" 4 and the House' 15 adopted the bill by significant
108. See infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
109. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995-96 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694. Section
21D adopts a pleading standard that conforms with the first sentence of Rule 9(b) but goes beyond the
language of the second sentence. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Id. at 747 n.23.
113. See In re Glenayre Tech. Inc. See. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting statute
did not change substantive law of scienter but did increase level of specificity required in pleading that
state of mind).
Much confusion existed as to the effect of the amended language. Many members of Congress
believed that the new pleading requirement was more strenuous than the Second Circuit's. See, e.g.,
141 CONG. REC. S17,933-04, S17,960-61 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Mr. Specter)
(criticizing proposed pleading standard as impossible to meet); 141 CONG. REC. S17,965-03, S17,080
(daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Mr. Heflin) (noting that most courts rejected Second Circuit's
approach and that proposed reforms raised even that requirement); see id. at S 17,984 (statement of Ms.
Mosley-Braun) (calling new pleading standard significantly higher than Second Circuit's); 141 CONG.
REC. H14,039-02, H14,041 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Mr. Dingell) (referring to adopted
standard as "highly burdensome" and bemoaning deletion of Specter amendment).
Other members of Congress, however, took the position that the Reform Act adopted the Second
Circuit's pleading standard. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S17,933-04, S17,960-61 (daily ed. Dec. 5,
1995) (statement of Mr. Dodd) (saying "the legislation adopts the Second Circuit's pleading
standard"); 141 CONG. REC. S17,965-03, S17,966 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Mr. Hatch)
(stating that "conference report adopts the pleading standard utilized by the Second Circuit"); see
Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 33, at 913 (arguing that Congress did not intend to adopt a scienter
standard more stringent than Second Circuit's).
114. See 141 CONG. REC. S17,933-04, S17,997 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (voting 65 to 30 for
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margins. Shortly thereafter, President Clinton vetoed it."6 In the message
accompanying his veto (the "Veto Message"), the President stated that
although he supported the effort "to end frivolous lawsuits," he was not
"willing to sign legislation that w[ould] have the effect of closing the
courthouse door on investors who have legitimate claims."'"17 He further
indicated his belief that the Reform Act "could well prevent" victims of fraud
from having recourse to the courts." 
8
The President specifically objected to the heightened pleading standard.
He indicated that the Conferees' intent to raise the pleading standard beyond
that defined by the Second Circuit was unacceptable, 19 because it would
"erect a higher barrier to bringing suit than any now existing--one so high
that even the most aggrieved investors with the most painful losses may get
tossed out of court before they have a chance to prove their case."' 20 Thus,
President Clinton indicated his concern that Congress, in its attempt to
prevent meritless suits, may have created legislation that was over-inclusive
and would too often allow actual fraud to go unremedied. Congress,
however, overrode President Clinton's veto,' 2' and the Reform Act became
law. t22
Under the new pleading standard, plaintiffs in all circuits must now plead
the circumstances surrounding the alleged fraud with particularity. In short,
the Reform Act requires courts to dismiss any complaints which do not:
(1) specify each statement or omission alleged to be misleading
passage).
115. See 141 CONG. REC. H14,039-02, H14,055 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (voting 320 to 102 for
passage).
116. See 141 CONG. REC. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
117. Id.
118. Seeid.
119. See 141 CONG. REC. H15,215 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995). The President also objected to
aspects of two other provisions of the Conference Committee Report that are not discussed at length in
this Article. Those provisions are: the extent of the availability of a "safe harbor" for certain
forward-looking statements accompanied by cautionary statements, and the disparate treatment of
plaintiffs and defendants in the provisions of the Reform Act awarding sanctions. See id.
120. Id
121. See 141 CONG. REC. H15,224 (Dec. 20, 1995); 141 CONG. REC. S19,180 (Dec. 22, 1995).
122. The Reform Act affects only matters filed on or after December 23, 1995. See Pub. L. No.
104-67, §§ 108-109, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (1995) (stating that amendments do not affect or apply to
matters commenced before and pending on date of enactment); Edge Partners, L.P. v. Dockser, 944 F.
Supp. 438,441 (D. Md. 1996) (finding Reform Act does not apply to suits commenced and pending on
December 22, 1995); Rubin v. Trimble, No. C-95-4353MMC, 1997 WL 227956, at *5 n.2 (N.D. Cal,
Apr. 28, 1997) (finding Reform Act did not apply to matter in which all complaints were filed by
December 19, 1995). But see Pilarczyk v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 965 F. Supp. 311 (N.D.N.Y.
1997) (applying Reform Act to suit filed on December 22, 1995, because it was neither filed before
nor pending on that date).
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(presumably the who, what, where, and when elements);
(2) specify the reasons why the alleged misstatement or omission was
misleading (the why element);
(3) if the allegation is based upon information and belief, specify the
facts upon which the belief is formed (also the why element); and
(4) where scienter is an element of the offense, state with particularity
all facts giving rise to a "strong inference that the defendant acted with
the required state of mind" (the how element).123
These changes essentially raise the transaction cost for filing suits, and,
thereby, attempt to restore the balance of power between plaintiffs and
defendants. To see how this pleading standard will work in practice, it is
helpful to consider it in the context of the preexisting common law.124
IV. THE REFORM ACT'S PLEADING STANDARD VIEWED IN LIGHT OF THE
COMMON LAW PRECEDING IT
By requiring plaintiffs to plead with particularity all elements of their
claims, including specifically "the reason or reasons why an alleged
misstatement was misleading when made" and "facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendants acted with scienter,"' 2 5 the Reform Act adopts
both the Ninth and Second Circuit tests-or more simply, requires plaintiffs
to plead with specificity the how and why of the alleged fraud.126 Further,
given Footnote 23, the Reform Act arguably urges courts to increase the
Second Circuit's standard for the how factor.' 27
123. 1934 Act § 21D(b)(1)-(2).
124. The above-described pleading standard applies to most types of allegedly misleading
statements. The Reform Act does, however, contain a "safe harbor" for certain types of so-called
forward-looking statements, including plans for future operations, anticipated economic performance,
and projections. The plaintiff must prove, and therefore plead, that those statements were made with
actual knowledge of their falsity. See Reform Act § 21E(c)(1)(B). One court addressed this issue in a
post-Reform Act case and noted that recklessness may not suffice in pleading such cases. See Hockey
v. Medhekar, No. C-96-0815 (MHP), 1997 WL 203704, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1997).
125. See supra notes 39-71 and accompanying text.
126. See Lerach and Isaacson, supra note 33, at 912.
127. See, e.g., infra note 176 and accompanying text. The Reform Act standard is similar to the
one applied in the First Circuit. See Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357, 365, n.10,
367 & n.16 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversing dismissal of certain claims where plaintiffhad pointed to internal
documents which contradicted contemporaneous public statements-the why element-and alleged
that some defendants who actually received reports were informed of accounting information
underlying alleged fraud-the how element); see also Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 9-10
nn.5-6 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that Reform Act did not apply to case, but that Congress intended to
increase pleading standard above pre-Reform Act, Second Circuit level, and that change in First
Circuit's pre-Reform Act standard was unnecessary because it already exceeded the Second Circuit's);
In re Boston Tech. Sec. Litig. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,174, at 90,572
(D. Mass. 1998) (noting that to satisfy scienter elements, plaintiffs generally identify "internal reports,
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This new pleading standard, Congress stated, would help to eliminate
strike suits. Certainly, it will at least do that.128 The question, however, is
whether, when combined with the stay-of-discovery provision, the Reform
Act will also eliminate those suits that have merit, but which, without the
discovery necessary to satisfy the pleading standard, cannot be pleaded with
the requisite particularity.
As Section II of this article detailed, the common-law standard preceding
the Reform Act sets forth a level of pleading specificity that usually required
plaintiffs to base their pleadings on internal company information. 129 And, as
previously noted, throughout the development of that standard, plaintiffs had
access to such internal information-through the discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 30 Thus, plaintiffs who did not have the
requisite internal company information at the time they filed a complaint
could revise and replead their allegations. The plaintiffs amended their
complaints while the discovery process progressed, resulting in several
amended and consolidated complaints and concomitant motions to
dismiss.' 3' For example, in the GlenFed case, the plaintiffs amended their
pleadings to juxtapose a publicly-filed company report and externally-made
company statements with what company officers said at a board meeting and
in internal audit documents.'3 2 Without discovery, as in the post-Reform Act
context, 33 plaintiffs usually do not have access to board meeting notes or
audit documents-the very type of information the GlenFed court held was
necessary to withstand the motion to dismiss. 34 Yet, in attempting to define
memoranda" and allege both contents and defendants possession of those documents at relevant time).
128. See Miller Testimony, supra note 6, at 162 (arguing Reform Act would chill filing of class-
action securities claims-even those which had merit); Securities Litigation, 1994: Hearings on H.R.
417 Before the Subeomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
103d Cong. 118, 242 (1994) (Testimony of Mark J. Griffin) [hereinafter Griffin Testimony] (stating
that proposed legislation would limit rights of investors to recover for fraud); Simon Testimony supra
note 22, at 285 (stating that proposed reforms would "virtually end securities class-actions by
defrauded investors" and "substantially weaken deterrence against fraud"); cf Seligman, supra note
73, at 446-47 (noting that application of Rule 9(b) standard to cases results in dismissal of meritorious
cases).
129. See supra notes 35-71 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, 24 F.3d 357 (1st Cir. 1994) (reviewing Third
Amended Complaint); see also Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1014.
132. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text. Although the court denied the motion to
dismiss certain allegations, it indicated those allegations might well have been deficient in other
respects. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 6, at 1550; cf Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d.
617 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, based in part on
fact that discovery was complete and the next stage would be summary judgment).
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the Reform Act's pleading standard, courts are looking to the case law
preexisting the Act. 135 The case law applied a standard that implicitly
required pleadings based on internal information. When combined and
strictly applied, therefore, the Reform Act's two provisions are likely to
result in the almost certain dismissal of complaints-regardless of whether
the fraud allegations have merit.1
3 6
Further, allegations based on publicly-available, insider-trading
information, which withstood a Rule 9(b) motion to dismiss in the Second
Circuit prior to the Reform Act, 137 are arguably insufficient after the Act. At
most, such allegations meet only the scienter provision, the how element of
the Reform Act, not the requirement that plaintiffs plead with specificity the
135. See, e.g., infra notes 145-61 and accompanying text; see also Weiss, supra note 49 (arguing
the Joint Statement language creates confusion over the appropriate interpretation of pleading
standard).
136. One article suggests that plaintiffs might use corporate inspection statutes to gain access to
the discovery necessary to meet the Reform Act's pleading standards. See Randall S. Thomas &
Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection Statutes for Discovery in Federal Securities Fraud Actions,
77 B.U. L. REV. 69 (1997). Although this idea has some merit, it is problematic for several reasons.
First, the empirical evidence in the article indicates that plaintiffs are not always successful in gaining
access to such information. See id at 73 (reporting shareholders gain access to books and records in
only slightly more than two-thirds of inspection cases). Further, according to the article, plaintiffs are
more likely to gain access to information such as stocklists, which are beneficial in shareholder proxy
fights, than to obtain the right to inspect books, board meeting minutes, or the other information
necessary to plead securities fraud claims with particularily. See id. (noting that plaintiffs obtain
stocklists in 78% ofstocklist cases, but non-stocklist cases are successful only two-thirds of time).
Second, plaintiffs who attempt to use such inspection statutes for books and records experience
delays of up to nine months. See id Thus, what are effectively one-year statutes of limitation for most
securities fraud matters would pose a serious barrier for plaintiffs who attempt to obtain information
through inspection statutes. See Law v. Medco Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 781, 785-86 (7th Cir. 1997)
(noting that statute of limitations for 1933 Act cases is one year and that this same limitation period
applies to 1934 Act eases with three-year statutes of repose); Fujisawa Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor,
115 F.3d 1332, 1334 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding one-year statute of limitations for Exchange Act case is
triggered when plaintiff learns or should have learned "through the exercise of ordinary diligence"
facts to warrant further investigation into fraud); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (holding that equitable tolling does not apply to statute of limitations
in securities fraud suits).
Third, in order to obtain such books and records, plaintiffs must articulate a "proper purpose."
Although at least so far the Delaware courts have not applied the proper-purpose test with the same
particularity as Rule 9(b), they have held that a plaintiff must do more than raise a "speculative"
possibility of corporate mismanagement to obtain books and records. See, e.g., Security First Corp. v.
United States Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 568 (Del. 1997). Thus, plaintiffs must provide
some evidence of the alleged mismanagement to justify further investigation. See id. If expanded, this
criteria could prohibit plaintiffs who have no evidence of fraud--or precisely those plaintiffs who need
the discovery-from obtaining it.
Finally, although plaintiffs have used the inspection statutes to gain access to corporate books and
records, history shows that when plaintiffs attempt to expand corporate causes of action in Delaware,
where many corporations are chartered, the Delaware courts tend to shut down such mechanisms. See
NELL MINOW & ROBERT MONKS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 35 (1995) (discussing influence of
corporations headquartered in Delaware on state's judicial branch). Thus, any effective use of such
statutes is likely to be short-lived.
137. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
falsity of the alleged misstatement, the why element. As defined by the Ninth
Circuit, this element requires the pleading of contemporaneous facts,
conditions, or statements to show that an alleged misstatement was false or
misleading when made. Again, plaintiffs usually meet this standard by
referring to internal company information.138
As a consequence, the Reform Act is likely to allow only the more
flagrant and obvious cases of securities fraud to proceed past a motion to
dismiss, while being overinclusive in its elimination of cases where it is more
difficult to identify, and therefore to plead, fraud. 139 Presumably, the SEC,
with its limited resources, pursues the flagrant and obvious cases of securities
fraud. 140 Arguably, however, the more difficult to identify frauds are
precisely the ones that the plaintiffs, who function as private attorneys
general, pursue.' 4' Indeed, the Commissioner of the SEC has stressed that
private mechanisms are important to the enforcement of the Acts. 42 Because
the plaintiffs lack access to the information the Reform Act requires them to
plead at the motion-to-dismiss stage, however, the strict application of the
heightened-pleading standard in combination with the stay-of-discovery
provision is likely to result in unredressed fraud.
Indeed, an analysis of decisions applying section 21D(b) reveals that this
conclusion is correct. As previously discussed, the language in section
21D(b)(2) left room for alternative views of what pleading standard Congress
favored for scienter or the how element.143 As a result, some of the post-
Reform Act opinions have found that Congress intended to adopt the Second
Circuit's standard while others have found that it intended to strengthen that
standard. What these decisions make clear is that the choice of a pleading
138. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
139. See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type H Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 712 (1996) (noting that impact of section 21D(b)(2) combined with stay-of-
discovery provisions may be to increase number of unremedied instances of fraud); Weiss, supra note
49, at 707.
140. See, e.g., SEC v. Crow, No. 96-1661 SCM, 1996 WL 635379 (S.E.C.) (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1,
1996) (where officer sold 75,000 shares of stock in company before bad earnings announcement and,
thereby, avoided $1.2 million in losses, SEC filed complaint against former CEO and president
alleging he caused company to overstate earnings and file false financial report).
141. See Stout, supra note 139, at 712; see also Griffin Testimony, supra note 129, at 241
(quoting SEC Chair Levitt's statement that private, class-action suits are "essential to the effective
operation of the federal securities laws"); 141 CONG. REC. S17,933-04, S17,955 (daily ed. Dec. 5,
1995) (statement of Mr. Dodd) (saying private securities litigation plays "vital" enforcement role); 141
CONG. REC. S12,201-02, S12,204 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1995) (quoting J. Carter Beese, Stop Choking
Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1995) (stating that former commissioner of SEC stresses importance
of strict enforcement of securities laws).
142. See Attitude Shift, supra note 72, at 937 (noting SEC views legitimate shareholder suits as
"important adjunct to [its] enforcement program").
143. Sek supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
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standard is likely to be outcome determinative; adopting the Second Circuit's
standard increases the likelihood that a complaint will survive a motion to
dismiss, but strengthening that standard will usually result in dismissal.
A. Cases Applying the Second Circuit's Standard
Some courts have applied the Second Circuit's approach, without any
analysis or explanation of why they chose it.Y44 Others, however, have
reviewed the language of section 21D(b)(2) and the Joint Statement and
concluded that Congress intended to adopt the Second Circuit's pre-Reform
Act pleading standard.1 45 Two of these opinions contain discussions which
help to illuminate both how the courts determined the standard to apply and
what they considered in applying it.
1. Marksman v. Chantal Pharmaceuticals
In Marksman v. Chantal Pharmaceuticals,146 a district court in the Ninth
Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that Congress intended to adopt a
more rigorous measure for pleading scienter than the Second Circuit's and
had, therefore, necessarily eliminated the "motive-and-opportunity" test. 47
The Marksman court stated that although the Joint Statement included
144. See, e.g.. Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 F. Supp. 431, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (adopting, without
discussion, Second Circuit standard); In re Wellcare Management Group, Inc. See. Litig., 964 F. Supp.
632 (N.D.N.Y 1997) (applying the Second Circuit standard without discussing Reform Act); STI
Classic Fund v. Bollinger Indus., Inc., No. 3-96-CV-823-R, 1996 WL 885802 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25,
1986). Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge at 2, adopted by District Judge No. CA 3:96-
CV-0823-R, 1996 WL 866699 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1996) (same, noting pending SEC complaint); cf
Rosenbaum & Co. v. H.J. Myers & Co., Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-824, 1997 WL 689288 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9,
1997) (dismissing complaint for failure to meet pleading standard without discussion of what standard
actually applied); Pilarczyk v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 965 F. Supp. 311 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (adopting,
without explanation, Second Circuit standard in dismissing complaint for failure to make sufficient
internal-information allegations).
145. See, e.g., Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that
Reform Act did not apply to this case, but that if it did, Second Circuit standard would apply); Sloane
v. Overseas Fund, Ltd., 941 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that Reform Act codified
Second Circuit pleading standard); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp.
1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (same); On Bank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 99,504, at 97,410 (W.D.N.Y. June 17, 1997) (adopting Second Circuit standard in
finding, without discussion, sufficient particularity on basis of general allegations); cf In re Health
Management, Inc. See. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y 1997) (finding Second Circuit's pre-Reform
Act standard controlling in denying, in part, motions to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged auditors had
withdrawn their opinion letter, analyst had written letter inquiring about violations, and SEC had
initiated inquiry into company's situation). Presumably, allegations as serious as those in Health
Management, Inc. should be sufficient under any standard.
146. 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
147. Id. at 1309-11. The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the Reform Act
abolished liability for reckless conduct. See id. at 1309 n.9.
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language which might be interpreted to support the defendants' contention,
the following factors were more persuasive:
(1) the Conference Committee's emphasis on the stringency of the
Second Circuit's standard implied that its jurisprudence most closely
approximated the Reform Act's pleading requirements;148
(2) the motive-and-opportunity test is quite stringent;149 and
(3) Footnote 23 of the Joint Statement (which contained the language
stating that Congress intended to adopt a standard more stringent that
the Second Circuit's) was an insufficient basis on which to "jettison"
the motive-and-opportunity test. 150
The court further reasoned that because the Committee chose to "imbed"
Footnote 23 in the legislative history, it could also have chosen to express
explicit disapproval for the motive-and-opportunity test.'5 ' Finally, the
Marksman court found that the motive-and-opportunity test is consistent with
Congress's stated purpose-making such cases more difficult to plead'15 2 -
because the test is an "exacting" one, which requires that the allegations
"yield a 'strong' inference of fraudulent intent."' 53 The court did not,
however, explain how using a pre-Reform Act standard would fulfill what it
found was Congress's intent, making such cases more difficult to plead.
Adopting the Second Circuit's motive-and-opportunity test, however,
allowed the court to avoid dismissing a complaint containing serious
allegations concerning insider trading. Analyzing the complaint, the court
first rejected allegations based on "generic" motives applicable to any CEO
(including a motive to enhance the value of her stock holdings, to complete a
private placement of stock, and to protect her position). 154 The court did,
however, find persuasive the plaintiffs' allegation that the CEO had sold $6.3
million worth of stock, representing twenty percent of her total holdings,
before adverse information about the company became public.
55
Furthermore, the court found that these trades were inconsistent with the
CEO's stock-trading patterns, because she had sold no stock during the prior
three years.' 56 These insider sales, the court concluded, met the plaintiffs'
148. Id. at 1310.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1311.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 1312.
155. Seeid. at 1312-13.
156. See id. at 1313.
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burden for pleading the requisite scienter under the Reform Act.15 7
The court next found that the complaint met the Second Circuit's
recklessness standard. 158 First, the plaintiffs' allegation that Marksman had
violated Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") by
inappropriately counting consignment sales as revenue was insufficient by
itself to support an inference of recklessness. 59 The court found, however,
that the GAAP allegations combined with allegations about the CEO's stock
sales, the timing of a recent private-placement offering, and overstated
revenues met the Second Circuit's and thus the Reform Act's pleading
standard. 6'
2. Rehm v. Eagle Finance Corp.
In another post-Reform Act case, Rehm v. Eagle Finance Corp.,161 a
district court in the Seventh Circuit found that, although Congress
"specifically declined to make the Second Circuit's case law an explicit part
of the statute,"' 62 the Second Circuit's standard was consistent with the
language and purpose of the Reform Act.163 Accordingly, the court found
that the plaintiffs could plead the requisite level of scienter if they could meet
either the motive-and-opportunity or the recklessness test.164 The court,
157. See id.; see also Zuckerman v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Tex. 1998)
(finding stock trades sufficient to support scienter element, where one insider sold $10.7 million in
stock days before company filed for bankruptcy, and another bought shares whenever company was
discussing sale of subsidiaries); Bryant v. Apple South, Inc. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 90,275, at 90,251 (M.D. Ga. July 29, 1998) (finding scienter allegations sufficient where
plaintiffs described nature of internal forecasting reports and timeframe of publication, and noting that
defendants had "dumped" large percentage of personal stock holdings within weeks of negative
announcement); Partners, L.P. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., No. 96-C-4072, 1997 WL 570771, at *17
(N.D. I1l. Sept. 10, 1997) (finding plaintiffs' allegations of insider trades met Second Circuit's motive-
and-opportunity test for scienter, but dismissing complaint for failure to plead other circumstances of
alleged fraud with particularity).
158. See Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1313-15. This portion of the opinion is less clear than the
stock-sale analysis, in part because the court refers to the stock sales as part of its finding that the
plaintiffhad successfully pleaded recklessness. See id. at 1314, 1314-15 n.13.
159. Seeid. at 1313.
160. See id. at 1313-14; see also Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, 959 F. Supp. 42, 50-51 (D. Mass.
1997) (finding that knowledge about product line combined with significant personal profits from
overallotment sales was sufficient to meet conscious misbehavior standard).
161. 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. III. 1997).
162. Id. at 1251.
163. See id. at 1252. The Rehm court supported its conclusion with three factors: (1) the
Conference Committee's "strong inference" language "mirrors" the Second Circuit language for Rule
9(b) cases; (2) the Joint Statement indicated that Congress explicitly based this language on the Second
Circuit's approach; and (3) the Second Circuit's standard balances the Reform Act's conflicting
goals-curtailing abusive litigation and protecting aggrieved plaintiffs. See id. The Rehm court stated
that it was not bound by the Second Circuit's interpretation of its standard, but that the Second
Circuit's standard was the appropriate one to apply. See id.
164. See id. Like the Marksman court, the Rehm court rejected general allegations about the
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however, rejected the plaintiffs' stock trade allegations. Instead, the court
found that two of the defendants had not sold stock during the class period,
thus belying the presumption that their inside knowledge of impending bad
times had triggered such sales. The court also found that the third defendant's
sales were small in magnitude and not unusual in timing.165
In applying the recklessness test to the complaint, the Rehm court, like the
Marksman court, found that GAAP allegations, without additional
allegations of facts tending to show the defendants' knowledge of, or reckless
disregard for, those accounting deviations, were insufficient. 166 The court
then considered the magnitude of the alleged violations in combination with
several other factors, 167 including allegations that the defendants "were
responsible for calculating and releasing the [allegedly incorrect]
information"; 168 that the GAAP violations concerned credit-loss reserves, the
'defining characteristic' of the [defendants'] loan servicing business"; 169 and
that the defendants issued positive business statements allegedly designed to
"mollify public doubt" about the company's business. 170 The court found
these allegations supported the scienter element, opining that it did not want
to raise the pleading standard so high that it would "preclude valid securities
fraud claims.'
17
'
Both decisions highlight the tension discussed throughout this article:
balancing what may be abusive securities fraud litigation with the important
service plaintiffs provide as private attorneys general. Finding the appropriate
mechanism to separate the frivolous cases from those that might have merit
is a difficult task to achieve through pleading standards alone.172
defendants' motives and looked primarily to the timing and amount of stock sales. See id. at 1253-54.
165. See id. The court rejected the idea that because it was the defendant's only stock sale, it
should be viewed as unusual. Instead, the court found that only sixteen months had elapsed since the
stock was issued, and it focused on the small percentage (6%) of the defendant's total holdings that
were sold. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1256.
170. Id. The court specifically found that the defendants publicly announced contrary indications
regarding the soundness of the company's accounting practices. The company first declared it had
made the appropriate adjustments to its loss reserves to solve the accounting problems. Less than two
weeks after making this statement, however, the defendants announced that the company's accounting
system was severely deficient. See id.
171. Id. at 1257; see also Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing
Rehm and adopting Second Circuit standard before denying motion to dismiss claim based on non-
forward-looking statements).
172. See Stout, supra note 140, at 719 (suggesting that changing pleading standard is not most
efficacious way to address strike-suit problem); Sec. Fraud Litig.: Concerning Litig. Under the Fed
Sec. Laws Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong.
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B. Rejecting the Second Circuit's Standard
Three opinions from courts within the Ninth Circuit found that the
Reform Act heightened the pleading standard for scienter and then applied
that new standard to the complaints before them. These opinions reveal the
new standard, when strictly applied, is difficult to meet and therefore
outcome determinative. 
73
1. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation ("Silicon I")
The first opinion under the Reform Act finding that Congress raised the
pleading hurdle was In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation
("Silicon I").174 At the beginning of its analysis of the Reform Act, the
Silicon I court specifically noted that prior to the Reform Act, plaintiffs in the
Ninth Circuit were required to plead with particularity why the alleged
misstatements or omissions were false or misleading, but were allowed to
plead the scienter element of their case generally. 175 The court then found
that Congress intended to adopt a more stringent pleading standard for the
scienter element; Footnote 23 indicates that Congress did not "simply
codify" the Second Circuit standard. 176 Instead, according to the court,
Congress's language in the Joint Statement, its rejection of language which
would have codified the Second Circuit's criteria, 7 7 and its implicit rejection
of the President's Veto Message (which stated that Congress was adopting a
more strict standard) 178 revealed an intent to raise the required level of
pleading. 179 Indeed, the court explicitly rejected Marksman.180 Instead, the
court found that adopting a more rigorous standard than the Second Circuit's
would better reflect Congress's intent to protect markets and investors by
127, 130 (testimony of Janet Cooper Alexander, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School) [hereinafter
Alexander Testimony] (stating that proposed pleading reform risks eliminating good and bad claims);
Levitt Testimony, supra note 25, at 38 (warning strict requirements may preclude meritorious cases
because plaintiffs are denied access to inside information). But see Weiss, supra note 49, at 678
(noting that any pleading standard creates trade-off between discouraging strike suits and rectifying
fraud, and concluding that no standard can strike perfect balance).
173. See also Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 999 F. Supp. 725, 727-28
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding Congress intended to adopt pleading standard higher than Second Circuit's);
Novak v. Kasaks, 997 F. Supp. 425, 429-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (same); Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, 959
F. Supp. 42,47-50 (D. Mass. 1997) (same).
174. 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
175. See id. at *5.
176. See id.
177. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
179. See Silicon 1, 1996 WL 664639, at *5.
180. See id. at *6 n.4.
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discouraging frivolous and abusive securities litigation. 181 Accordingly, the
court found that post-Reform Act plaintiffs "must allege specific facts that
constitute circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior by defendants."'] 82
This standard amounts to a requirement that plaintiffs must plead evidence of
subjective intent with specificity. 183
The Silicon I court's finding that the Reform Act required it to apply a
new, stricter standard was key to its dismissal of the plaintiffs' allegations.
The plaintiffs had met the Ninth Circuit's preexisting requirements by
indicating the who, what, where, when, and why elements of the alleged
fraud,'84 but the court found that the plaintiffs failed to allege scienter with
sufficient particularity.' 85 In reaching this conclusion, the court applied
Second Circuit law, reasoning that "[h]aving found that the pleading standard
under the [Reform Act] was at least as strict as the Second Circuit's, [it could
not] require anything less" of the plaintiffs in this case. 186 The court also
rejected what it called the plaintiffs' "unsubstantiated" allegations that
Silicon Graphics had internal forecasts and budgets revealing that the
Company faced serious financial problems. 87 The court noted that "every
sophisticated corporation" uses internal forecasts, and, therefore, if general
allegations of "negative internal reports" sufficed, every company would be
exposed to litigation whenever its stock price dropped.
88
Next, the court considered the defendants' alleged insider trades, finding
neither the amount nor the timing of stock sales suspicious.'8 9 According to
the court, the sales amounted to only a small fraction of the defendants' total
181. Seeid.at*5.
182. Id. at *6. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that congressional statements during the
post-Veto debate revealed that the Reform Act actually adopted the Second Circuit's standard. See id.
The court reasoned that a few statements by individuals were insufficient to overcome the language of
the Joint Statement. See id. Instead, according to the court, the "authoritative source" for interpreting
Congress's intent was the Committee Reports (here the Joint Statement) on the Reform Act. See id.
(citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186
(1969))).
183. See Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (agreeing with Silicon I court's
reasons for adopting higher pleading standard, and finding combination of defendants' insider trades
and proximity of alleged misstatements to bad news was sufficient to deny motion to dismiss); see also
Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding Reform Act increased Second
Circuit's pleading standard, then denying motion to dismiss when plaintiffs alleged (1) insider trades
for three defendants, including one defendant's trades amounting to 70% of holdings; and (2) strategy
on part of defendants to inflate stock value for specific strategic combination).
184. See Silicon , 1996 WL 664639, at *8.
185. Seeid. at*12.
186. Id.
187. See id. (citing Complaint at para. 30).
188. Id
189. See id.
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holdings, and the alleged trading patterns in the questioned time frame were
consistent with those made in previous quarters. 9 ' The court then dismissed
the complaint191 and allowed the plaintiffs twenty days in which to
replead.1
9 2
2. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation: ("Silicon II") 93
The plaintiff repleaded, and in May 1997, the court issued a second
opinion'14 addressing whether allegations of recklessness were sufficient to
support an inference of scienter under the Reform Act. 95 This time, the court
reviewed the Second Circuit's law on recklessness. 196 It divided the cases
into three different categories: (1) those allowing "unqualified allegations of
recklessness [to] suffice to establish scienter"; 97 (2) those finding
recklessness sufficient to support scienter only where the defendant had a
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff;198 and (3) those requiring actual intent or
circumstances implying intent. 99 The court noted that although the Second
Circuit had not expressly overruled the earlier cases in categories (1) and (2),
the more recent, type (3) cases required a strong inference of fraudulent
intent.2° Congress, the court found, rejected the more lenient standards
similar to (1) and (2) above when drafting the Reform Act,20' and therefore
implicitly adopted the third, most strict approach. 20 2 Thus, the court
concluded "[m]otive, opportunity, and non-deliberate recklessness may
provide some evidence of intentional wrongdoing, but are not alone
sufficient to support scienter unless the totality of the evidence creates a
strong inference of fraud., 20 3 Instead, it found that "in order to state a private
securities fraud claim, plaintiffs must create a strong inference of knowing or
intentional misconduct," defined as deliberate recklessness. 2°4
190. See id.
191. See id. at *16.
192. See id.
193. 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
194. The court specifically rejected pleas from the plaintiff and the SEC to reconsider its finding
that the Reform Act adopted a pleading standard more stringent than the Second Circuit's. See id. at
754.
195. See id. at 755-57.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 755 (citing Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1974) (en bane)).
198. See id. (citing Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), amended,
1978 WL 4098 (2d Cir. May 22, 1978)).
199. See id. (citing Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054, 1058 (2d Cir. 1984)).
200. See id.
201. Seeid. at 756.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 757.
204. Id. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Reform Act pleading standard did
1998]
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Applying this test to the plaintiffs' complaint, the court first found that,
despite the plaintiffs' protestations to the contrary, the allegations in the
complaint were based on information and belief.205 Under the Reform Act,
such allegations require plaintiffs to "'state with particularity all facts on
which that belief is formed.' 20 6 As a consequence, the court found that the
plaintiffs had to plead "the sort of information" referred to by legislators who
had criticized this provision, including "the names of confidential informants,
employees, competitors, Government employees, members of the media, and
others who had provided information leading to the filing of the case" as well
as any existing "whistle-blower."
207
The court found the plaintiffs' scienter allegations failed to satisfy these
requirements.20 8 The plaintiffs had bolstered their Silicon I allegations of
negative intemal reports with descriptions of financial, budget, and other
reports.20 9 These descriptions included the dates and contents of some
reports. 210 For example, the plaintiffs pleaded that "all defendants received a
'flash' report generated by the finance department on October 3-4, 1996,
showing that sales were below forecasted levels.",211 According to the court,
these allegations were "more elaborate" than those in Silicon I, but were still
"too generic" to support the requisite inference of fraud.2t 2
not apply retroactively to the conduct at issue in this case. Instead, it found that the Reform Act
applied to cases filed after the effective date, regardless of when the alleged misconduct occurred. See
id. at 914-15; see also Hockey v. Medhekar, No. C-96-0815 (MHP), 1997 WL 203704, at *3-4 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 15, 1997) (same). But see Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205, 209
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding the Reform Act did not reject Second Circuit's "conscious misbehavior"
standard, so plaintiffs allegations that defendants repeatedly "promised immediate finding" for
company while knowing that funding would not occur until one month after transactions closed were
sufficient).
205. See Silicon 11, 970 F. Supp. at 763. The court found that paragraph 96 of the plaintiffs'
complaint revealed that they did not have personal knowledge about their allegations; therefore, the
complaint had to be based on information and belief. See id. Paragraph 96 read:
Plaintiffs have alleged the foregoing based upon the investigation of their counsel, which included
a review ofSGI's SEC filings, securities analysts reports and advisories about the Company, press
releases issued by the Company, media reports about the Company and discussions with
consultants, and believe that substantial evidentiary support will exist for the allegations set
forth... after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.
Id. For the text of the Reform Act on information and belief, see supra note 108 and accompanying
text.
206. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (b)(1)(B) (Supp. I 1996)).
207. Id. at 763 (citing statements of Representative Bryant, 141 CONG. REC. H2848 (Mar. 8,
1995), and Representative Dingell, 141 CONG. REC. H2849 (Mar. 8, 1995)).
208. The court again found that the plaintiffs had not pleaded the who, what, where, when, and
why elements with the requisite specificity. See id. at 767.
209. See id. at 766.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 767.
212. See id. The court reasoned, as it had in Silicon I, that the Second Circuit had rejected similar
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Instead, the court found that the plaintiffs had to allege specific details
about the internal reports, including: titles, dates, authors, recipients, and
contents, as well as the names of sources from which the plaintiffs acquired
the alleged reports.213 After stating that some of the documents the plaintiffs
had submitted in camera suggested that they possessed information that
would improve the complaint, the court granted the plaintiffs a final
opportunity to replead.214
Finally, the court turned to the allegations about the defendants' stock
trades, scrutinizing each individual's trades as a proportion of his total
holdings and in light of his prior trading patterns.1 5 The court rejected claims
about three of the defendants, finding that trades amounting to 2.6%, 4.4%,
and 7.7% of available stocks and options were consistent with prior trading
patterns and were therefore insufficient to buttress allegations of scienter.216
The court did find it significant, however, that two defendants, who did not
have a trading history for comparison, had traded 43.6% and 75.3% of their
available stocks and options during the class period.217 The court concluded
that these trading allegations might be sufficient to meet the pleading
standard if the plaintiffs were also able to provide further information on
their allegations about negative internal reports.218
Thus, the Silicon II court found that allegations of unusual insider trades
alone were insufficient to meet the Reform Act's new heightened pleading
standard.2 19 This finding, however, eliminates the plaintiffs' main avenue for
pleading scienter with publicly available information.220 Nevertheless,
allegations in the past on the basis that any "billion dollar company with international operations and
multiple products will generate a variety of reports at regular time intervals." Id. (citing San Leandro
Emergency Med. Plan v. Philip Morris, 75 F.3d 801, 813 (2d Cir. 1995)).
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. Seeid. at768.
217. See id.
218. See id. The plaintiffs declined to replead, claiming that their original pleadings were
sufficient and that they could not add to them without disclosing protected work product. The court
rejected this contention, noting that assuming the information was sufficient for the complaint to
withstand dismissal, it would be subject to immediate discovery. The court then dismissed the
complaint with prejudice. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393 FMS, 1997 WL
337580 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 1997). The case is now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
219. See also Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that stock
sales are insufficient to support scienter allegations).
220. Another case that reveals how severe the emphasis on internal information in the new
pleading requirement can be is Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997). The Zeid court
dismissed the complaint, noting that the plaintiffs failed to support their "general allegations" with
references to inconsistent contemporaneous statements or "information made by or available to
Defendants." Id. at 920. The court found that in order to plead the why element, the plaintiffs needed to
quantify allegedly "poor sales," or reference reports or other information to show that the company's
"sales staff was performing badly." Id. Further, the court specifically found insufficient a general
19981
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Silicon II reveals that when strictly defined and applied, the Reform Act's
test is very stringent.2 1 Furthermore, because the pleading standard results in
the dismissal of claims, it is unlikely that we will ever know with certainty
what the ultimate affect of the pleading standard will be.
3. Hockey v. Medhekar
In another post-Reform Act case, Hockey v. Medhekar,222 a different
judge in the Northern District of California concurred with the Silicon I
opinion223 finding that the Reform Act adopted a standard more strict than
the Second Circuit's. The Hockey court, however, faced a slightly different
problem from its Silicon counterpart. Because the alleged misstatements
pleaded by the Hockey plaintiffs were, according to the court, forward-
looking in nature, they were subject to a safe-harbor provision of the Reform
allegation that the defendants "had access" to internal information. See id. Instead, the court found that
the plaintiffs had to reference such reports or information to survive dismissal. See id.
In another example of the severity of the pleading standard in a stayed-discovery context, the
court found that lists of customers with estimates of allegedly "improper" sales were insufficient. See
id. at 923. According to the court, a sufficient complaint would "allege facts regarding the underlying
transactions with particularity," including the names of employees who made statements about product
returns to customers, the dates of such returns, and cites to purchase orders and quotes of sales terms.
Id.
Regarding scienter, the court found inadequate an alleged motive to inflate the company's stock
price to obtain a better acquisition price, partly because the defendants had revealed all the alleged
problems and suffered a stock-price decrease before completing the acquisition. See id. at 924. The
court also used its finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege the why element with particularity to
support its finding on the how element: "Plaintiffs fail to allege contemporaneous facts showing that
each allegedly misleading statement was false when made. Thus, there are no specific facts to create
an inference that Defendants knew the statements were false." Id. Zeid is also now on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit. See also Novak v. Kasaks, 997 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that complaint
failed to identify internal information sufficient to support allegations and, where plaintiffs relied on
consultants for such information, requiring that those consultants be identified in complaint; noting
that counsel's statements as to internal information were insufficient and finding that plaintiffs had to
identify exact documents); In re Health Management Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 97 Civ. 1865 (HB),
1998 WL 283286, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1998) (dismissing allegations which did not specify
customers, nature of customers' payment problems, or extent of decreased profitability and lower
margins); In re Digi Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1099 (D. Minn. 1998) (dismissing
allegations of problematic product-return policy, where plaintiffs failed to specify terms of program,
including which products were included, how long returns were to be extended, manner in which
program "encouraged" customers to delay returning products, how program affected number of
returns).
221. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 997 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (requiring, for scienter
analysis, that counsel assert that defendants actually knew or actually saw certain internal documents,
not just that they should have seen or known about them).
222. No. C-96-0815 (MHP), 1997 WL 203704 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1997).
223. See id. at *10-*1 1. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Reform Act's
pleading requirements were substantive changes in the law and did not, therefore, apply to conduct
which took place before their enactment. See id. at *2-*4.
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Act.224 The Reform Act explicitly denotes the requisite state of mind
applicable to forward-looking statements: plaintiffs must prove that the
person making the statement did so "with actual knowledge... that the
statement was false or misleading.
' 225
The Hockey court first reviewed the complaint's misstatement allegations
for compliance with the Ninth Circuit's and the Reform Act's why or falsity
element. It found the plaintiffs' allegations insufficient, noting that they had
relied on "as-yet-unconducted discovery" to substantiate their allegations.
226
Such reliance on future discovery, the court reasoned, was inappropriate
because the Reform Act's stay-of-discovery provision was enacted to prevent
such pleading practices.22 7 Specifically, the court found insufficient the
plaintiffs' reliance on "unidentified 'negative internal non-public
information.' ' 228 Instead, the court required that, at a minimum, the plaintiffs
plead facts sufficient to show the internal documents existed;229 identify the
"particular corporate document[s] or data"; describe when such documents
were created; and state who was responsible for their preparation or allege
whether they were regularly prepared.230
The court noted that, in the absence of discovery, this stringent pleading
standard was difficult for the plaintiffs to meet.231 It found, however, that it
could not ignore the "clear mandate" of the Reform Act despite the harsh
consequences to the plaintiffs. 2
In its analysis of the scienter or how element, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' contention that proof of recklessness was sufficient to meet the
Reform Act's standard.233 It distinguished Marksman and Zeid, noting that
they did not involve forward-looking statements and therefore were not
subject to what it found was the Reform Act's new actual knowledge
23
requirement.  Then, citing to Silicon I, the court found that the plaintiffs'
224. See id. at *5-*6. The plaintiffs argued that the alleged misstatements were not forward-
looking, but the court disagreed. See id. The court also stated that if the plaintiffs chose to replead the
complaint, they should make clear which alleged misstatements were forward-looking. See id. at *6
n.8.
225. Id. at *9-*10 (quoting the Reform Act, § 27A(c)(1)(B)(i)). This distinction allowed the court
to avoid a lengthy analysis of Footnote 23.
226. Id. at *7.
227. See id.
228. Id. at *7.
229. See id.
230. See id at *8.
231. See id.
232. Id.; see also James D. Cox, Making Securities Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497,
521 (1997) (arguing that many forms of fraud may become public only after statute of limitations has
expired and that Reform Act's discovery-stay provision is therefore particularly harsh).
233. See Hockey, 1997 WL 203704, at *10.
234. See id.
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reliance on unidentified internal documents was insufficient to plead scienter
for forward-looking statements as well.235
Assuming, without so finding, that suspicious insider trades might meet
the requisite inference of actual knowledge, the court dismissed the plaintiffs'
trading allegations as insufficient.236 It found that neither the timing nor the
amounts of the trades were suspicious: the defendants sold more stock before
the class period than during it, and sold only a small percentage of their total
holdings.7 Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint in its entirety,
allowing the plaintiffs sixty days to replead.238 This opinion, like the Silicon
decisions, further emphasizes the outcome-determinative nature of the
internal-information pleading standard and, makes clear that without
discovery, plaintiffs are unlikely to meet the heightened standard.239
C. Opinions On the Reform Act's Stay-of-Discovery Provision
The stay-of-discovery provisions of the Reform Act have received
235. See id.; see also Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. III. 1997) (dismissing
allegations of fraudulent forward-looking statements, without discussion of Reform Act standard,
where plaintiffs failed to plead facts showing alleged misstatements were false when made).
236. See Hockey, 1997 WL 203704, at *11. The court specifically noted that some of the alleged
insider sales occurred before the date of the alleged misstatements and could not, therefore, "serve as
motivation for" those misstatements. See id.
237. See id. at * 1. The Hockey court, like all of the others considering this question post-Reform
Act, found allegations that the defendants desired to increase the price of the company's stock
insufficient to allege motive. See id. at *11 & n.12.
238. See id. at *11. The court's instructions to the plaintiffs reveal its frustration with the nature of
their first complaint. In its closing paragraph, the court stated the following:
Should plaintiffs choose to file an amended complaint, the court orders that plaintiffs: 1) specify
which statements were allegedly false and which were allegedly misleading due to omissions; 2)
clarify which allegedly false and misleading statements were forward-looking and which were
not; 3) clearly state the bases for each of their allegations[;) ... and 5) avoid gratuitous hyperbole
(such as exclamation marks) and shorten the background portion of the complaint.
Id.; see also Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (criticizing
complaint and noting that review of it "require[d] a laborious deconstruction and reconstruction of a
great web of scattered, vague, redundant, and often irrelevant allegations); In re Glenayre Tech., Inc.
See. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 294, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting leave to replead, but requiring plaintiffs
to indicate in "bold face type or otherwise" factual allegations new or different from those in first
amended complaint).
239. See Glenayre, 982 F. Supp. at 297-98 (applying heightened standard to deny motion to
dismiss complaint containing allegations of pending FCC action, but granting leave to replead given
"troubling nature" of allegations); In re Baesa See. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(finding heightened standard to be whether complaint states "sufficient particulars to reasonably raise a
strong inference that a given defendant participated in the making of the allegedly fraudulent
misrepresentations or omissions either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for a
known and obvious danger of their being untrue"; then dismissing complaint for conclusory scienter
allegations); Havenick v. Network Express, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (finding
plaintiffs failed to plead who, what, when, where, and why elements with particularity, and that
allegations of insider trades were insufficient to meet post-Reform Act heightened scienter standard).
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considerable attention. Many plaintiffs have filed motions requesting
discovery,240 and most have been denied. In an early order issued in the
Hockey litigation described above, the district court granted the plaintiffs
some discovery 24' by distinguishing between the term "automatic
disclosures" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and the Reform Act's
use of the term "discovery."242 The court found that by using the word
"discovery," not "disclosure," in the Reform Act, Congress sought to
distinguish between the two.243 As a result, the court ruled that although the
plaintiffs were not entitled to discovery, they were entitled to Rule 26
automatic disclosures. 2"
The district court certified its order for immediate appeal,245 and the Ninth
Circuit quickly reversed the lower court, holding that Congress intended to
prevent plaintiffs from filing first and then searching for evidence to support
their claims.246 Thus, the opinions reviewing the stay-of-discovery provisions
are uniform-discovery is unavailable until after the resolution of motions to
dismiss. 247
240. See, e.g., Powers v. Eichen, 961 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (staying all discovery during
pendency of motion for reconsideration); Novak v. Kasaks, No. 96 CIV. 3073 (AGS), 1996 WL
467534 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1996); In re Trump Hotel Shareholder Derivative Litig., No. 96 CIV. 7820
(DAB) (HBP) 1997 WL 442135 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1997) (finding stay applied to all Exchange Act
claims including § 14(a) claim alleged in complaint with derivative claim).
241. See Hockey v. Medhekar, 932 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
242. Id.at25l.
243. Id. at 252.
244. See id. This distinction appears to be one of form over substance. Parties may, but need not,
provide documents to meet their Rule 26 obligations. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (parties shall
provide "a copy of, or a description by category and location of all documents"). Thus, plaintiffs
would have gained little through this mechanism.
245. See Hockey, 932 F. Supp. at 252.
246. See Medhekar v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Califomia, 99 F.3d
325 (9th Cir. 1996).
247. Although the stay-of-discovery provision states that discovery to prevent "undue prejudice"
or the destruction of evidence is permissible, the standard is difficult to meet. See Medical Imaging
Ctrs. of America, Inc. v. Lichtenstein, 917 F. Supp. 717, 721 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (noting "destruction"
language refers primarily to possible death of witness, and undue prejudice standard requires a plaintiff
to establish "unique" need for discovery); Mishkin v. Ageloff, 220 B.R. 784, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(finding "particularized discovery" requirement linked to both undue-prejudice and preservation-of-
evidence exceptions to stay); Powers v. Eichen, 961 F. Supp. 233, 234-36 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (construing
statutory term "pendency" broadly to prohibit discovery during district court's determination on
motion to dismiss, any motions for reconsideration, and any interlocutory appeal; noting that if
plaintiffs wanted to plead prejudice due to lack of discovery, they had to point to "particular
circumstances or evidence"); Novak v. Kasaks, [1996-97 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
199,301, at 95,862 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1996) (staying discovery where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
exceptional circumstances to justify exception; noting that plaintiffs must demonstrate "great risk" of
loss of highly relevant evidence or "undue prejudice"); cf In re Websecure, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1997 WL
773717 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 1997) (granting expedited discovery where plaintiffs "particularized"
request to spending of initial public offering proceeds and company's business plans and prospects
and, given preliminary injunction request and bankruptcy context, plaintiffs met "undue prejudice"
test). But see In re Glenayre Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 294, 299 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting
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D. Summary
As the opinions discussed above reveal, some courts have found that
Congress intended to adopt the Second Circuit's standard, while others have
found that the Reform Act calls for a more stringent measure.248 Many of the
new opinions are from district courts within the Ninth Circuit, making it
likely that, in the near future, the Ninth Circuit will provide some guidance as
to which courts-Marksman or Silicon and Hockey-that court believes have
interpreted the Reform Act correctly. Early opinions from courts within the
Second Circuit reveal a similar split, with some courts adopting its pre-
Reform Act pleading standard, while others require that complaints meet an
increased standard.249 These cases indicate that a circuit split is probable. At
this stage, however, the early opinions confirm this Article's claim respecting
the likely impact of the Reform Act: when vigorously applied, the
combination of a strict pleading standard with a stay of discovery creates a
pleading barrier so high that few complaints will survive it.
As noted in the discussion of Footnote 23 of the Joint Statement and the
text surrounding it,250 Congress not only declined explicitly to adopt the
Second Circuit's standard but also appeared to indicate that it wanted a more
stringent review of the particularity of complaints. If courts adopt this stricter
interpretation, then the plaintiffs must plead the scienter or how element with
more particularity than previously acceptable in the Second Circuit, plead the
falsity or why element with specificity, and meet the criteria for these
standards without discovery.
251
This new requirement for scienter means, as stated above, that insider-
trading allegations are no longer sufficient to meet the scienter
requirement. 252 Indeed, this is one of the teachings of Silicon 11.253 The
problem with this standard, however, is that pleadings based only on routine
publicly-available information such as insider trades are insufficient, and
judge asked plaintiffs whether some limited discovery would aid them in meeting Reform Act's
"stringent" requirements, and plaintiffs responded that their complaint was already sufficient).
248. See Berkowitz v. Conrail, Inc., No. Av. A. 97-1214, 1997 WL 611606, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
25, 1997) (finding complaint failed to meet even Second Circuit's standard and that therefore
discussion of whether higher standard applied was unnecessary).
249. Compare, e.g., On Bank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
T 97,504 at 97,410 (CCH) (W.D.N.Y. June 17, 1997) (adopting Second Circuit standard and denying
motion to dismiss), with, e.g., In re Glenayre Tech., Inc., Sec. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (adopting heightened standard for scienter and granting motion to dismiss with leave to replead).
250. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 174-219 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
253. See id.
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post-Reform Act plaintiffs must meet an internal-information standard
designed for pre-Reform Act cases.5 4 Accordingly, the Reform Act's
pleading standard, if strictly applied and interpreted, will eliminate most
private securities-fraud lawsuits and be overinclusive in its impact.2
55
V. CORRECTING THE PROBLEM THROUGH MANAGERIAL-JUDGE
LEGISLATION
As stated above, the momentum for reform was based primarily on the
perception that plaintiffs' attorneys were filing minimally sufficient
complaints and then using their entitlement to extensive and expensive
discovery to hold the defendants hostage and demand settlements. 6 In its
attempt to correct this perceived imbalance of power between plaintiffs and
defendants, Congress adopted both the pleading and stay-of-discovery
provisions and shifted the power almost entirely to the defendants.2 57 Yet, as
discussed above, strict application of the pleading standard without discovery
may have serious consequences for the future of such claims. To remedy this
situation, Congress should adopt a solution that balances both the need to
maintain private enforcement and the need to limit frivolous suits. It could
achieve this balance by enacting a managed-discovery provision. Such a
provision would achieve the same goal in a less draconian manner, while
protecting what Congress, the SEC and scholars agree is an important goal-
providing a tool necessary to enforcement of the Acts and thereby
maintaining fair and efficient markets. 8
A managed-discovery program might work as follows. After the plaintiffs
254. As discussed earlier in this paper, see supra note 71, other public information may suffice,
but such information is relatively rare. Two post-Reform Act cases illustrate this point. The first case,
In re Valujet, Inc., Securities Litigation, No. 99,579, 1997 WL 710380 (N.D. Ga. 1997), survived the
heightened pleading standard because after the plane crash, FAA reports that appeared to contradict
earlier company public statements became public. The second case, In re Health Management, Inc.,
Securities Litigation, 970 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), also survived the heightened pleading
standard. The allegations in this case included a withdrawn auditor's opinion, a letter from an analyst
inquiring into the same financial problems that led to the auditor's withdrawal, and an SEC inquiry.
See also City of Painesville, Ohio v. First Montauk Fin. Corp., 178 F.R.D. 180, 185-89 (N.D. Ohio
1998) (finding complaint met heightened pleading standard, but noting that company had previously
disclosed existence of Securities and Exchange Commission investigation and indictments in Florida);
ef Glenayre, 982 F. Supp. at 297-98, 299 (noting allegations of pending FCC action, but denying
motion to dismiss with leave to replead).
255. This strict standard could have a serious, and unintended, impact on Securities Act claims,
for which scienter is not an element. See infra notes 272-361 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text.
257. See 1997 SEC Report at 2.
258. See Joint Statement of the Managers at 31; Seligman, supra note 73, at 455-46 (class actions
ensure enforcement of mandatory disclosure systems, and, thereby, deter fraud, reduce insider trading,
and increase confidence in markets).
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file and serve the complaint and a lead plaintiff is chosen, discovery would
be stayed for a brief initial time period, for example, twenty days.259 The
court would require defendants and plaintiffs to file briefs on the motion to
dismiss and schedule an argument, with a short deadline for deciding and
issuing its opinion on the motion. Any alleged misstatements that fail to meet
the standard motion-to-dismiss strictures of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), 2  as well as any alleged misstatements for which the plaintiffs have
not pleaded with specificity the publicly-available elements (who, what,
when, and where) would be dismissed with prejudice.261 This would allow
the court to focus on the more difficult how and why elements.
Once the court has narrowed the contours of the complaint to include only
those alleged misstatements pleaded with some particularity and which
appear to be actionable, the court would design a limited discovery program
to fit the remaining alleged misstatements. This program might include
production of a limited set of documents and a prohibition on depositions.
262
259. See, e.g., In re Lotus Dev. Corp. Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting that
Court granted stay of Rule 26 automatic disclosure provisions subject to expedited briefing schedule).
260. This Article focuses on the particularity arguments under Rule 9(b), and does not address the
arguments defendants usually raise pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Frequently, defendants argue that
certain alleged misstatements are not actionable because they are not material as a matter of law. These
types of statements fall into two general categories. The most prominent are statements that "bespeak
caution" or that by their nature warn against the eventuality over which the plaintiffs are now suing.
See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1213-14 (1st Cir. 1996) (dismissing various
statements as nonactionable under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine). The other general category of
dismissable statements are those on which a reasonable investor would not rely because they amount
merely to "puffing." See, e.g., Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1992) (where alleged
misrepresentations or omissions are obviously unimportant to investor, court may rule they are not
actionable); Colby v. Hologic, 817 F. Supp. 204, 211 (D. Mass. 1993) (finding nonactionable
statement that "long term prospects [were] bright").
261. See supra notes 31-32. Generally, courts have been reluctant to dismiss with prejudice
complaints at the initial motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., May v. Borick, No. CV 95-8407 LGB (Ex),
1996 WL 397442 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1997) (dismissing with prejudice first-amended complaint, or
second complaint); Neubronner v. Young, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. 99,478 at p.
97,215 (CCH) (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 1997) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of second-amended
complaint). The rationale for doing so here, however, is that when a statement is nonactionable as a
matter of law, it should not reappear in later versions of the complaint. Similarly, because the who,
what, where and when elements are publicly available, any failure to plead them with specificity in the
initial complaint is inexcusable. See Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(dismissing certain alleged misrepresentations where plaintiffs failed to plead exact statements as
released to marketplace; noting that content of publicly-made statements are not matters "peculiarly
within" knowledge of company).
262. Obviously, allowing document discovery but not depositions amounts to a decision about
which form of discovery is the most revealing and which is the most burdensome, and the appropriate
balance between different types of discovery. Requiring top officers to participate in depositions
before a complaint meets some minimal standard would be inefficient and would not help to diminish
settlement pressure. In the absence of so-called "smoking-gun" documents, however, depositions are
perhaps a better way for plaintiffs to discover facts concerning intent.
[VOL. 76:537
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss2/4
PSLRA'S INTERNAL-INFORMATION STANDARD
The type of documents discoverable would, of course, depend on the
allegations, but Congress could require judges to tailor the type of
discoverable documents, and the time period for relevant discovery, to the
surviving portions of the complaint. For example, in the type of case
frequently cited in the reform debates-a new, emerging company sued
within a year of its initial public offering ("IPO") and immediately following
a drop in its stock price---the court might require production of the CFO's
IPO files, the underwriter's IPO files and the accountants' work papers
pertaining to recent audited financials referenced in the offering documents.
Again, the court would establish a strict schedule for the production and
review of documents-for example, ten days for each party to meet its
obligations-and then require plaintiffs to replead their complaint on the
basis of the limited discovery. This structured discovery program would
address the defendants' concerns about extensive and expensive discovery,
while allowing plaintiffs access to the information necessary to meet the
newly-adopted pleading standard.
The affect of requiring, by statute, judges to take an active role in the
discovery process would be significant.2 63 Compared to the pre-Reform Act
situation, limiting the discovery mechanism would shift the balance of power
in the direction of defendants. It would decrease the amount of discovery
available to plaintiffs prior to a final decision on a motion to dismiss and,
accordingly, decrease the costs of such suits. 264 Consequently, the incentive
for the defendants to settle simply to avoid those costs would also
decrease.265
The obvious response to such a proposal is that judges can implement
phased or managed discovery now.266 The answer to that point is that they
can, but most do not-at least in these types of cases.267 Indeed, those
263. See Levitt Testimony, supra note 25, at 36 (advocating "more active case management on the
part of the judiciary"); Alexander Testimony, supra note 173, at 135 (saying active case management
by judges could help "streamline" process).
264. Judges would also become more familiar with the facts in the case and be better able to
assess the likelihood of settlement.
265. Many commentators have argued that defendants settle meritless suits simply to avoid further
discovery or the disruption of their business or because they are risk-averse. See, e.g., Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?: A Study of Settlement in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 497, 569 (1991); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 437, 440 (1988); Avery Katz, Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 3, 4-5 (1990); see also H.P. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (including
testimony estimating that securities-fraud discovery costs may amount to 80% of total costs).
266. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1597 (1998) (noting that trial judge has "broad
discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery").
267. See, e.g., In re Lotus Dev. Corp. Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp. 48, 53 (D. Mass. 1995) (refusing to
stay discovery for additional time where complaint was "not so clearly deficient" as to supersede
policy underlying Rule 26 provisions); see also Cox, supra note 230, at 523 (noting that courts could
and should have, but have not, played role in other aspects of securities class actions).
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involved in litigation and discovery disputes know that judges generally
dislike the discovery process and prefer not to become involved in it.268 As a
result, defendants are left without bargaining power or any control over the
process. By giving defendants a statutory power to enforce a streamlined
discovery process, however, Congress could encourage judges to take the
active role required in securities fraud claims.269
Further, this program would right what, in securities fraud matters unlike
most other areas of the law, is a discovery imbalance. Generally, litigation
contains an internal limitation on both parties' discovery demands that works
as simply as the proverbial golden rule: do unto others as you would have
them do unto you. It is, in fact, likely that judges understand this maxim and,
as a result, grant all but the most frivolous discovery requests on the
assumption that the demands will even out in the end.
In securities cases, however, the discovery imbalance lacks an internal
limitation and therefore requires an external correction. Despite their
voluminous discovery requests to defendants, plaintiffs have very little to
offer in the form of reciprocal discovery. Indeed, since the adoption of the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine in 1988,270 proposed class plaintiffs are not
required ever to have had any contact with the company or the individual
defendants they are suing.27' They may not even recall the content of the
complaint and may know little about the company or its products.272 As a
result, in the average securities case, the plaintiffs' document production
consists solely of trading slips, and, in contrast to the defendants' depositions,
which may last several days, class plaintiff depositions usually last for only
part of one day.
273
268. Consider for example, a recent antitrust case in which the court specifically noted that the
plaintiff's discovery requests to a nonparty were overbroad and not even limited to the industry in
question. See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 169 F.R.D. 44, 50-51 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1996).
Although the court specifically noted that it had the authority to modify the plaintiffs' requests it
declined to do so. See id. at 53. For a discussion of judges and their role in managing discovery, see
Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73
TEX. L. REV. 753, 782-83 (1995).
269. See Easterbrook, supra note 90, at 644-46 (discussing benefits of judicial control over
discovery process).
270. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
271. See, e.g., Priest v. Zayre Corp., 118 F.R.D. 552, 554 (D. Mass. 1988) (finding no merit in
defendants' argument that proposed plaintiff should be disqualified because he had no memory of
documents cited in complaint); Basic, 485 U.S. at 241, 250 (holding reliance on misrepresentations
may be presumed).
272. See, e.g., Priest, 118 F.R.D. at 554.
273. Defendants who attempt to obtain additional information, for example, concerning the
proposed plaintiffs' trades in other stocks, generally lose such motions. See, e.g., Burstein v. Applied
Extrusion Tech., Inc., 153 F.R.D. 488, 488-91 (D. Mass. 1994) (denying motion to compel securities-
trading information unrelated to company at issue); In re Dataware Sec. Litig. (Motion to Compel and
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Statutorily limited discovery provisions, however, would create an
external constraint. Further, such a statutory provision would give defendants
a legal rule to which they could point and, thereby, provide them with a basis
to pressure judges to enforce the externally-created discovery limit.2 74
VI. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORM ACT'S
HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARD
As discussed above, the Reform Act stays all discovery while motions to
dismiss are pending under either the Securities Act or the Exchange Act.
2 75
Based on this author's interpretation of the standard adopted, however,
plaintiffs must have access to internal company information in order to meet
the new pleading standard.276 This standard may have an unintended
consequence on claims brought pursuant to the Securities Act. Before the
Reform Act, many circuits held that when a complaint included Exchange
Act and Securities Act claims, dismissal of all counts-even those for which
scienter was not an element-was appropriate on the ground that the
complaint sounded in fraud. This section argues both from doctrine and from
theory that in the post-Reform Act era, courts should decline to dismiss in
their entirety complaints that plead claims under section 11277 and section
12(2)278 of the Securities Act ("Securities Act Claims") along with an
Exchange Act Claim. Instead, courts should allow Securities Act Claims
which meet the strictures of Rule 12(b)(6)279 to withstand dismissal.
A. The Common-Law Approach to Complaints with Multiple Counts
Often, complaints that allege the defendants committed fraud under the
Exchange Act also include Securities Act Claims. 280 The effect of the
Exchange Act Claim is to expand the class period and thereby the potential
damages.281 The elements of these allegations, however, are strikingly
Order, Feb. 1996) (granting only one request in Motion) (on file with author).
274. See William M. Richman et al., The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S. CAL.
L. REV. 959, 992-94 (1987) (suggesting limited discovery combined with forfeited bond payments by
plaintiffs for cases in which plaintiffs allege information exclusively within province of defendants or
for strike suits).
275. See supra notes 238-45 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., supra notes 221-37 and accompanying text.
277. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994).
278. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994).
279. Seesupra note 1618 and accompanying text; supra note 258.
280. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996); Pahmer v. Greenberg,
926 F. Supp. 287 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
281. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1994) (limiting damages to (1) the difference between the purchase
price of security-not to exceed the public offering price and value of security at time of lawsuit; (2)
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different. In contrast to an Exchange Act Claim, which requires a plaintiff to
plead and prove scienter,a82 a section 11 claim is, with respect to the issuer, a
strict liability claim.a83 Liability for issuers under this provision is "virtually
absolute, even for innocent misstatements. ' 84 For other defendants, it
operates as a negligence claim.285 Thus, to plead such a claim, plaintiffs need
allege only that they bought stock in the company; that a representation in a
registration statement was materially false or misleading; that the defendants
are liable under section 1I(a); and that they are acting within the one-year
statute of limitations.286 Generally speaking, section 12(2) claims, which are
based on misleading statements in a prospectus, are negligence claims.287
Thus, such claims should be subjected only to the short-and-plain-statement
standard of Rule 8(a).2 88
Despite these important differences, many courts have held that when a
complaint sounds in fraud, all counts of the complaint are subject to the
strictures of Rule 9(b), which has its roots in the scienter element.289 Indeed,
some courts have held that even where the Securities Act Claims in a
the price for which security was.sold before lawsuit; or (3) the price for which security was sold after
commencement of lawsuit but before judgment-if less than (2); and including provision for
defendants to prove price decline was due to factor other than registration statement); see also 15
U.S.C. § 771 (1994 & Supp. I 1996) (allowing recovery at tender of"consideration paid for" security,
with interest, minus amount of income received thereon ... or damages). Prior to the Reform Act, no
such limitation existed for 1934 Act cases. See, e.g., Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 113
F.3d 645, 649 n.6 (7th Cir. 1997) (ruling damages in 10b-5 cases are usually based on difference
between purchase price ofstock and what value would have been if truth were known).
282. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
283. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994); see also Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1123 (holding allegations that
defendants possessed information they failed to disclose do not convert non-scienter claims into
allegations of fraud; "[o]therwise, any allegation of non-disclosure of material information would be
transformed into a claim of fraud"); Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1973) (holding
section 11 proscribes innocent or negligent misstatements).
284. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,382 (1982) (footnote omitted).
285. Non-issuer defendants, such as underwriters, have a due-diligence defense, or a defense of
reasonable care, available to them under section l1(b). See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1994); see also
Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382. As a result, claims against them are negligence-like in their
application. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURmES LAW HANDBOOK § 14.08 (1996).
286. See, e.g., In re Gap Stores See. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283 (D.C. Cal. 1978) (to prevail plaintiff
must prove registration statement contained false or misleading statement or omission at effective date
and need not prove reliance, causation, or scienter).
287. See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist.
Facilities Corp., 490 F. Supp. 1364 (D.C. Cal. 1980) (noting a party may violate section 12(2) even if
merely negligent). These claims are harder to prove because they require privity between the seller and
the buyer. Thus some courts have held that when underwriters handle the sale of the securities, the
issuer cannot be liable under section 12(2). See, e.g., Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1214-16.
288. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1222-23; Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1991);
Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 892-93 (7th Cir. 1990); Hershey v. MNC Fin., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 367,
375-76 (D. Md. 1991).
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complaint do not allege intent, knowledge or scienter, if the complaint
incorporates allegations either pertaining to or underlying an Exchange Act
Claim, it "sounds in fraud." 290 Others have assumed, without so stating, that
Rule 9(b) applies.291 Thus, the courts have dismissed entire complaints for
failure to plead with particularity, even when a complaint containing the
Securities Act Claims, pleaded separately, would not be dismissed for that
reason.
292
This approach misconstrues the statutes underlying Securities Act Claims
which, like their Exchange Act counterparts, protect investors from
misstatements and omissions. Nothing in the provisions of the Securities Act
requires plaintiffs to prove, and thereby to plead, scienter or fraud. Indeed,
Securities Act Claims are not fraud claims at all.293 Thus, it appears that
courts have inappropriately used Rule 9(b) as a mechanism to screen out
entire complaints rather than just the scienter-based claims.294 The fact that
courts have increased their use of Rule 9(b) in securities-fraud matters at a
290. Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 287; cf Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir.
1997) (assuming without deciding that Rule 9(b) may apply to Securities Act Claim but declining to
do so when allegation that defendants failed to make "reasonable investigation" of allegedly
misleading statements was negligence-like); Sheppard v. TCW/DW Term Trust 2000, 938 F. Supp.
171 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying Rule 9(b) analysis only to 10(b) allegations, and finding that where
complaint does not incorporate by reference allegations of fraud into counts alleging violations of
sections 11, 12(2) and 15 of the Securities Act, complaint does not sound in fraud). But see In re
NationsMart Corp. See. Litig., 130 F.3d 309 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that even if plaintiffs alleged fraud
in complaint containing section 11 claims, such allegations "would be mere surplusage"); FED. R. Civ.
P. 8(e)(2) (stating that when complaint includes multiple counts and one would be sufficient, "pleading
is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements").
291. See, e.g., Sears, 912 F.2d at 892-93.
292. See, e.g., Shaw, 82 F.3d 1194 (analyzing two complaints, one alleging only Securities Act
claims and one alleging both Securities and Exchange Act claims). Compare id. at 1211 (holding that
for purposes of motion to dismiss complaint alleging only Securities Act Claims, court assumes
alleged misstatements were misleading when made), with id. at 1223 (holding that where complaint
alleges both Securities and Exchange Act Claims, it "sounds in fraud," and plaintiffs must plead all
allegations with particularity); but see Nelson v. Paramount Communications Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1242,
1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that Rule 9(b) is not applicable to Securities Act Claims); In re Ann
Taylor Stores Sec. Litig., 807 F. Supp. 990, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same); Ross v. Warner, 480 F.
Supp. 268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same).
293. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1223 (noting that fraud is not an element of Securities Act Claims).
294. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the federal courts can not use Rule 9(b) except for
complaints alleging fraud and mistake. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). Moreoever, although sparse, the history of Rule 9(b)
does not support its expansion to non-fraud claims. See Richman et al., supra note 271, at 967-77
(noting that Rule 9(b) has its roots in "reluctance to question settled transactions," and torts of deceit
involving face-to-face business transactions, and that particularized pleadings have become more "a
matter of reflex than logic"); see also Union Switch & Signal Co. v. Day, 16 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1926)
(noting that claim "sounds in fraud" where "without the dolus no cause of action is stated"). Thus, the
doctrine appears to have evolved as a sorting mechanism; that is, when a complaint alleges, for
example, a contract claim, but is actually based on a fraud claim, the complaint should be subject to
Rule 9(b). Rule 9(b) should not, however, apply to a complaint alleging two distinct contract and fraud
claims. The same is true of a complaint alleging claims under both Acts.
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rate that appears to be greater than that for other types of fraud claims
exacerbates this problem.295 The Reform Act, however, creates a statutory
standard that applies only to Exchange Act Claims, an implied cause of
action-not the express Securities Act Claims. Accordingly, courts should
now begin to analyze the counts in these complaints separately.
B. The Reform Act and Its Legislative History
The first step in interpreting any statute is to look at the text of the statute
itself because elected representatives vote for the statute, not committee
reports or floor debates.296 A review of the Reform Act reveals that the
pleading-standard provision, unlike the common law preceding it, applies
only to Exchange Act Claims.2 97 Indeed, the language of section 21D(b), as
well as several other provisions of the Reform Act, supports such an
interpretation.
Section 101(b) of the Reform Act contains the heightened pleading
standard.298 It amends only the Exchange Act by inserting section 21D.299
Subsection (b) of section 21D, titled "REQUIREMENTS FOR
SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS"300 restricts the applicability of the
heightened pleading standard provision to matters "arising under this title."
301
The term "title" refers to the Exchange Act. 30 2 Thus, as drafted, the
295. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1297, at 613-14.
296. See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (advising that statutory
construction begins with words and text).
297. Presumably, the new pleading standard applies to any Exchange Act claim for which scienter
is an element, including proxy claims brought pursuant to § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1994). See
Union ofNeedletrades v. May Dept. Stores Co., No. 97 Civ. 3120, 1997 U.S. Dist. WL 714886, at *5-
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1997) (noting Reform Act pleading standard applies to proxy claims). This new
standard is likely to create its own controversy in the realm of proxy litigation because, although most
circuits have adopted a negligence standard, at least one has held that these causes of action require
proof of scienter. Compare, e.g., Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 189-90 (3d Cir.
1988) (holding negligence is appropriate standard in 14a-9 case), with Adams v. Standard Knitting
Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422,428 (6th Cir. 1980); see also RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON,
ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, § 18.04[E] (1998) (discussing
standard and doctrines adopted by various courts).
298. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 743 (1995).
299. The language of§ 101(b) states: "(b) SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934.-Title I of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (78a et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 21C the
following new section:...."
300. 109 Stat. at 746.
301. Id.at747.
302. It is worth noting that Congress amended the Exchange Act directly. See id. at 752.
Accordingly, although courts may look to how courts proceeded under Rule 9(b) before the Reform
Act to determine how to apply the new heightened pleading standard, they should not consider the
Rule 9(b) approach to determine when the new pleading standard applies. On the latter point, Congress
has spoken. Thus, Congress has both redefined the pleading standard and indicated when it should be
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heightened pleading standard applies only to Exchange Act Claims, not to
Securities Act Claims.
Further, the language and purpose of Rule 9(b) and the basis for the
common law preceding the Reform Act support the argument that, as
adopted, the heightened pleading standard applies only to Exchange Act
Claims. As discussed above, the Rule 9(b) analysis has its roots in the
scienter element of such claims,303 an element not required for Securities Act
Claims.30 4 Indeed, Securities Act Claims are not fraud claims at all. At the
most, they are negligence claims. 30 5 Thus, the rationale for invoking Rule
9(b) in the first place--scienter-is not applicable.30 6 As a result, it would be
both illogical and contrary to the plain language of the statute to apply the
heightened pleading standard to any claim other than those brought pursuant
to the Exchange Act.307
Other provisions of the Reform Act further support the argument that the
heightened pleading standard does not apply to Securities Act Claims. For
example, many sections of the Reform Act contain amendments identical to
those in both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Specifically, Congress
included identical stay-of-discovery provisions for both the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act.308 Indeed, the stay-of-discovery provision for the
Exchange Act immediately follows the heightened pleading standard.309
Other identical provisions amending both Acts include the passages referring
to: certifications required to be filed with class action complaints;
310
appointment of lead plaintiffs;311  awards to class representatives;
312
applied.
303. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 279-85 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 281-84 and accompanying text.
306. Cf Richman et al., supra note 271, at 979-84 (challenging three common reasons for
applying Rule 9(b) to Exchange Act Claims: (1) because allegations of securities fraud arise in an
impersonal context and many firms sued remain both viable and profitable, concern about harm to
defendants' reputations is unfounded; (2) adequate notice is not unique to securities fraud, therefore,
such claims do not require review different from general Rule 12 options; and (3) although potential
for strike suits exists, it is better remedied by Rule 11, not Rule 9(b)).
307. Indeed, Title III of the Reform Act, "AUDITOR DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE
FRAUD," lends further support to this argument. See 109 Stat. at 762-64. This provision of the
Reform Act requires public accountants performing audits required by the 1934 Act to implement
provisions both to detect and report fraud. Title III, however, amends only the 1934 Act. Such a
provision was unnecessary for § II claims for two reasons. First, § 11 does not require proof of fraud
or that an alleged misstatement or omission be knowingly made, only that it be made. Second, § 11
provides auditors with a due-diligence defense.
308. Compare 109 Stat. at 737 (amending 1933 Act), 741 (creating stay of discovery), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77z-l(a)-(b) (1994), with 109 Stat. at 743 (amending 1934 Act), 747 (creating stay of discovery).
309. See id. at 747.
310. Compare id. at 737-38, with id. at 743 (requiring plaintiffs to certify they read complaint
before filing).
311. Compare id. at 738-740, with id. at 743-45 (creating new standards for courts to apply when
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settlements filed under seal;313 attorneys' fees;314 disclosure of settlement
terms;315 attorney conflicts of interest;316 sanctions for "abusive litigation;"
317
written interrogatory rights; 318 and prohibitions on attorneys' fees from SEC
disgorgement funds.
319
By making so many parallel changes, Congress arguably demonstrated
that when it intended to make the same change in both Acts, it did so.3
20
Congress did not, however, include a provision like section 21D(b) in the
portion of the Reform Act amending the Securities Act. It is reasonable to
infer from this absence that Congress did not intend for the pleading standard
to apply to Securities Act Claims, therefore, courts should not extend the
pleading standard to such claims.
321
The Reform Act also contains some provisions which amend only the
Exchange Act because certain reforms were applicable only to it. For
example, Congress added damages limitations to the Exchange Act.322 A
similar amendment to the Securities Act was unnecessary because damages
for Securities Act Claims were already defined statutorily.323 The same is
true of the Reform Act's amendment requiring parties to provide security for
the payment of costs for Exchange Act Claims:324 the Securities Act already
contains such a provision.325 These amendments, like section 21D(b), were
appointing lead plaintiff).
312. Compare id. at 740, with id. at 745 (restricting cash awards to class representatives).
313. Compare id. at 740, with id. at 745 (detailing certain settlement provisions).
314. See id. at 745 (setting limitations on attorneys' fees).
315. Compare id. at 740-41, with id. at 745-46 (providing descriptions of information to be
disclosed with settlement terms).
316. Compare id. at 741, with id. at 746 (requiring courts to determine whether attorneys who are
both members of class and wish to represent class should be allowed to do so).
317. Compare id. at 741-42, with id. at 747-48 (mandating that courts review pleadings and make
findings concerning compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (b)).
318. Compare id. at 742, with id. at 748 (requiring courts to submit, at defendants' requests,
interrogatories to jury about its findings of'scienter).
319. Compare id. at 756, § 103(b)(1)(f), with id. § 103(b)(2)(4) (prohibiting practice of paying
attorneys fees from SEC disgorgement funds).
320. "It is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another." BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994); see also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 (1992) (stating that courts consider entire legislative scheme of which
provision is part; interpretation should not be confined to individual sections).
321. Section 103(a) of the Reform Act, which contains prohibitions on referral fees, amends the
Exchange Act, but contains a reference incorporating its provisions into the Securities Act as well.
This passage supports the argument that Congress amended both of the Acts with identical conditions
only when it intended to do so. Compare 109 Stat. 756 § 103(b)(1)(f), (b)(2)(4), with id. § 103(a)(8).
322. See id. at 766.
323. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 771 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); see also supra note 278.
324. See 109 Stat. at 746, § 101(a)(8).
325. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1994).
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necessary only in the Exchange Act, thereby lending further support to the
contention that section 21 D(b) applies only to such claims.326
Finally, section 102 of the Reform Act, which amends both the
Securities 327 and Exchange Acts328 to create a safe harbor for certain
forward-looking statements, 329 reveals that Congress carefully chose when to
incorporate scienter into the Securities Act. The safe-harbor provisions are
identical; each contains language concerning scienter.330 These reforms allow
certain statements to qualify for protection as forward-looking in nature and,
thereby for immunity from suit, unless a plaintiff is able to show either (1)
that the alleged misstatement was made with "actual knowledge that the [it]
was false or misleading" 331 or (2) that it was made with the approval of an
executive officer who knew that it was false or misleading.332 The inclusion
of a specific definition of the state of mind for scienter in these provisions of
the Reform Act reveals that Congress was cognizant of the difference
between the Acts. Therefore, Congress's omission of such a change in the
Securities Act also reveals its intent. Thus, courts should not extend the
pleading provisions to Securities Act Claims.
Although the text of the statute is arguably clear and therefore resort to
the legislative history of the Reform Act is unnecessary,33 3 a brief look at the
published legislative history accompanying the Senate Report3 34 reveals
Congress's intent to apply the heightened pleading standard only to
Exchange Act Claims.335 For example, in the description of section 104 of
the Senate Bill reported out of the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
Committee (the "Committee")---"Requirements for securities fraud actions'"-
the Committee described the stay-of-discovery and heightened pleading
326. The location of this provision in the Reform Act is particularly interesting. It appears
between the settlement-disclosure and attorney conflict-of-interest provisions discussed supra notes
3 05-17 and accompanying text. Thus, although Congress specifically amended both of the Acts with
identical provisions on either side of this one, it did not incorporate this amendment into both.
327. See 109 Stat. 749; 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Supp. II 1996).
328. See 109 Stat. 753; 15 U.S.C. § 7 8u-5 (Supp. 111996).
329. See supra notes 222-23.
330. Compare 109 Stat. at 750, § 27A(c)(1)(B)(i), with id. at 754, § 21E(c)(1)(B)(i).
331. Id.
332. Compare id. at 750, § 27A(c)(1)(B)(ii), with id. at 754, § 21E(c)(1)(B)(ii).
333. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
334. The House of Representatives did not issue such a Report. See 141 CONG. REc. 679 (1995);
see also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) ("[Tlhe authoritative source for finding the
Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which 'represen[t] the considered and
collective understanding of those congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed
legislation"' (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))); RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416,421
(7th Cir 1993) (Conference Report "is most persuasive evidence of congressional intent besides the
statute itself').
335. See id. at 705.
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standard provisions. 336 When the Committee discussed the stay-of-discovery
amendments, it noted its intent to add such a stay to each of the Acts.337 It did
so. The second paragraph of the Committee's description, however, which
addresses the heightened pleading standard, specifically states that the
provision applies only to Exchange Act Claims.33 8 Taken together, these two
paragraphs in the Committee's report, which appear near each other, reveal
that Congress intended the pleading standard to apply only to Exchange Act
Claims.
339
C. The Policy and Purpose of the Securities Act
In general terms, the Securities Act regulates public offerings of
securities340 and the Exchange Act regulates aftermarket trading.34' Thus, the
Securities Act requires transactional reporting 342 and the Exchange Act
periodic reporting for companies that have made an initial public offering of
securities under the Securities Act.343 The purpose of the Securities Act is to
require a company that wants to raise capital by issuing securities to the
market to provide disclosures to potential investors sufficient to enable them
to make "rational investment decision[s]. 344 Accordingly, the Securities Act
requires extensive disclosures about a company, based on the premise that
informational asymmetries exist between issuers and purchasers, such that
purchasers can act rationally only when they have access to otherwise
non-public information about the company in question.
These informational asymmetries are most serious in IPOs-the type of
offering often at issue in complaints raising both Securities Act and
336. Id
337. See id. The Report states: "Section 104(a) (1) amends section 20 of the 1933 Act by adding a
new subsection (k) and (I) and adds a new section 36(c) to the 1934 Act, (i) requiring the court to stay
discovery...." Id.
338. See id. The Report states: "Section 104(b) amends the 1934 Act by adding a new section 36,
establishing pleading standards for section 10(b) actions alleging untrue statements or omissions of a
material fact." Id
339. The accompanying provision of the Report which contains the "ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF
SENATORS GRAMM, MACK, FAIRCLOTH, BENNET, GRAMS, AND FRIST," lends further
support to this interpretation. See CONG. REC. at 711, 713. Here the Senators discuss the "Standard of
Liability (Section 104)" and refer specifically to Rule 1Ob-5 actions. See id. at 713.
340. See Louis LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 34 (3d ed.
1995).
341. See id.
342. See id. at 126.
343. See id.
344. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (noting the Securities Act "was
designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public
offerings"); see also ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 719 (1986).
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Exchange Act Claims. By definition, an IPO is the company's first issuance
of securities to the market. Before the IPO, the company was not subject to
the periodic-reporting requirements of the Exchange Act; consequently,
potential investors had limited information about the company.345
The Securities Act addresses this informational asymmetry by requiring
IPO issuers to file both a registration statementf46 and a prospectus, 347 which
is part of the registration statement.348 To meet the disclosure requirements,
these documents must include a wide range of information about the
company.349 For example, a company must describe its history, business, and
current operations, including products, markets, and competition;350 capital
structure;351 financial condition and past performance; 352 directors and
officers, detailing both compensation arrangements and describing their
relationship to the issuer;353 offering terms and plans for using the offering
proceeds;354 commission agreements with the underwriters;355 and pending
345. The informational-asymmetry problem is less acute in the case of an offering of a company
that has been public for several years and, therefore, subject to the periodic reporting requirements of
the 1934 Act. Indeed, the duplicativeness of the the Acts' provisions in this context has received
considerable criticism. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reengineering Corporate Disclosure: Coming
Debate Over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1143 (1995); Milton H. Cohen, Truth
in Securities Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340 (1966).
The SEC has adopted an integrated disclosure system to address this issue. See CLARK, supra note
341, at 750; Cohen, supra (for initial discussion of integrated disclosure system). The SEC first
proposed this system in 1980-8 1. See Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6235, 20 S.E.C. Docket 1175 (Sept. 2, 1980);
Reproposal of Comprehensive Revision of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6331,
23 S.E.C. Docket 288 (Aug. 6, 1981). It adopted the program in 1982. See Adoption of Integrated
Disclosure Systems, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, 24 S.E.C. Docket 1318 (Mar. 3, 1982). The
integrated-disclosure program allows companies that meet certain criteria to use less complicated and,
thereby, less expensive registration forms. See CLARK, supra note 341, at 750.
The SEC's Wallman Commission has proposed additional reforms to shift the focus of the Acts
from a transaction-based to a registration-based system and which is designed to ease the cost of and
restrictions on the sale of securities. See Wallman Commission Report (the "Report"). The Wallman
Commission's proposal for a new registration-based system excludes IPO's from eligibility in the
registration-based system. Further, the Report actually proposes an increase in § 11 liability for some
offerings. Thus, despite the overall changes and integration advocated by the Wallman Report, it
continues to highlight the differences in the stated purposes underlying the two Acts-particularly in
the context of initial public offerings.
346. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994). Other public offerings are also subject to these provisions.
347. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1994). Again, other public offerings are also subject to these
provisions.
348. See id.
349. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1202 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that "[tihe
obligations that attend the preparation of [Securities Act filings] embody nothing if not an affirmative
duty to disclose a broad range of material information").
350. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (1992).
351. Seeid. §229.201.
352. See id. § 229.301-304.
353. See id. § 229.400-402 (4-1-96).
354. See id. § 229.504.
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legal proceedings, if any. 6 The extensiveness of the obligatory disclosures
is further evidence of their importance and supports the argument that courts
should interpret the Reform Act in a manner that allows for the enforcement
of these obligations.
An analogy to the "disclose or abstain" standard applied to insider trading
cases 3 57 further reveals the importance of Securities Act disclosures and their
enforcement When a company "goes public," many of the securities offered
for sale are owned by its officers and directors. Those same officers and
directors often own additional securities and options to purchase securities
which are not offered for sale, but which they expect will increase in value
after the public offering. Although they possess considerable information
about the company and its short-term and long-term prospects for the future,
potential investors have access only to the information provided pursuant to
the Securities Act or additional information the company chooses to disclose.
In this way, IPOs are analogous to insider trading and the "disclose or
abstain" analogy applies. Therefore, officers and directors must disclose
material information about the company or refrain from engaging in a public
offering.
358
Given the informational asymmetries present in both initial public
offerings and insider trading, it makes sense that Congress would have left
unchanged the express and accessible remedies designed to enforce the
Securities Act's disclosure provisions. These remedies are an important
means of ensuring that the private enforcement mechanism will continue to
function. If courts extend the Reform Act's more stringent, Exchange Act
pleading standard to Securities Act remedies, they diminish the enforcement
power of those remedies. Therefore, courts should not extend the new
pleading requirements to Securities Act Claims.
The express nature of the Securities Act enforcement mechanisms also
supports the argument that the courts should refrain from imposing the new
pleading standard on such claims. Unlike the implied cause of action for an
Exchange Act Claim, Securities Act Claims are express causes of action that
allow private investors to enforce a company's disclosure obligations.
359
These remedial provisions act as the incentive for a company to adhere to its
355. Seeid. § 229.103.
356. See id. § 229.509.
357. See United States v. O'Hagan, 65 U.S.L.W. 4650 (U.S. June 25, 1997) (No. 96-482) (holding
insiders are subjected to a duty to disclose inside information or to abstain from trading in order to
prevent corporate insider from taking improper advantage of uninformed shareholders).
358. Cf Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1203-04 (Ist Cir. 1996) (applying insider-
trading analogy to shelf offerings).
359. See supra note 341.
[VOL. 76:537
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss2/4
PSLRA'S INTERNAL-INFORMATION STANDARD
disclosure obligations. By crafting express causes of action, Congress
indicated the importance it attached to the completeness and accuracy of
public-offering disclosures and its intent to subject public offerings, and
thereby the companies, officers, and directors making them, to investor
scrutiny.36 In similar vein, Congress's reforms of the Exchange Act Claims
may be viewed as its attempt to remedy the uncertainty inherent in the
implied cause of action. Conversely, Congress's decision not to make similar
changes to the Securities Act Claims may be viewed as a reflection of its
intent to protect its earlier-drafted express causes of action.
Finally, claims under the Securities Act are easier to prove than those
under the Exchange Act, further indicating the importance Congress attached
to the requisite disclosures. Securities Act Claims are strict liability and
negligence causes of action.36 1 In order to prove liability, plaintiffs need not
prove the more difficult element of scienter.362 In addition, unlike Exchange
Act Claims, Securities Act Claims do not require plaintiffs to prove reliance
on the alleged misstatement or omission,363 again making the claims easier to
prove. Thus, these express and accessible Securities Act provisions further
reflect the importance Congress attached to them.
364
D. Summary
The full disclosure provisions of the 1933 Act, the process it regulates, the
raising of capital by company insiders, and its express and accessible
enforcement provisions reveal that Congress intended to ensure that
companies desiring to raise capital in the market disclose a broad range of
information to that market.365 The purpose of these disclosures is to eliminate
the informational asymmetry generally present in public offerings and
particularly in IPOs. Indeed, these disclosures diminish the insider-trading
aspects of these offerings. Given the importance of the disclosure obligations
and their enforcement, courts should not restrict those provisions by applying
the Reform Act's stringent pleading standard to Securities Act claims.
360. See supra notes 337-53 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 280-84 and accompanying text.
362. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1223 (emphasizing "[f]raud is not an element of a claim under either
section 11 or 12(2), and plaintiff asserting such claims may avoid altogether any allegations of scienter
or reliance"); see supra notes 302-04 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
364. Congress did not amend the Securities Act's enforcement provisions. By not doing so,
Congress indicated that it still expects companies to provide full and accurate disclosures in
public-offering documents and intends for plaintiffs to have access to the enforcement provisions. The
Wallman Report further supports this point of view. See supra note 341.
365. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1982) (indicating basic purpose
of Securities Act is "to provide greater protection to purchasers of registered securities").
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Moreover, the stringency of the standard as applied in the Silicon and
Hockey cases discussed above emphasizes the importance of analyzing such
claims separately. For example, in one post-Reform Act opinion the court
analyzed a complaint containing both Securities Act and Exchange Act
Claims366 and incorrectly concluded that because prior to the Reform Act, its
circuit had held that such complaints were grounded fraud, they should still
be analyzed under that standard. The court reached this conclusion by
looking only to Ninth Circuit law before the Reform Act and rejected the
plaintiffs' attempt to plead both Securities Act and Exchange Act Claims as
one that simply inserted "boilerplate language" into the complaint.367 It then
dismissed the entire complaint for failure to plead with particularity,368
thereby highlighting the problem discussed in this Part of the Article.
Heightened pleading standards may result in the dismissal of strict liability
and negligence causes of action based on a pleading standard premised on
intentional behavior.369 The statute reveals that Congress did not intend such
an outcome. Therefore, courts should decline to apply the heightened
pleading standards to Securities Act Claims and allow litigation over those
claims to proceed.370
VII. CONCLUSION
By using a new model to make sense of the pre-Reform Act pleading
standards, this Article creates a base from which to evaluate the new pleading
standard and stay-of-discovery provisions. My analysis of those pleading
standards highlights an implicit condition-that in order to survive a motion
to dismiss, plaintiffs must plead internal company information in their
complaints. This internal-information standard, when combined with the new
stay-of-discovery provision, creates a requirement that if strictly applied is
outcome determinative and likely to be overinclusive in its elimination of
such claims. Early decisions under the Reform Act support this argument. I
366. See In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV-S-96-708-PMP, 1997 WL 581032, at *7 (D.
Nev. May 20, 1997).
367. See id. at *8.
368. Seeid.at*13.
369. See Schoenhaut v. American Sensors, 986 F. Supp. 785, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that
§ 11 and § 12(2) claims must be pleaded with particularity to withstand dismissal where plaintiffs
pleaded fraud); cf. Gross v. Medaphis Corp., 977 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (applying heightened
pleading standard to allegations of fraud supporting Securities Act Claim; denying motion to dismiss
without explanation of which standard the court chose or how plaintiffs pleaded how element).
370. See Feiner v. SS & C Tech., 11 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Conn. 1998) (refusing to apply
heightened pleading standard to complaint alleging only 1933 Act claims, noting that claims sounded
in negligence, not fraud and that scienter standard might apply only to complaints alleging claims from
both Acts).
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propose that Congress correct this problem by repealing the stay of discovery
and instead adopting managerial judge provisions to process such claims.
Such a mechanism would better balance the competing goals of protecting
the markets and limiting abusive litigation.
This Article further predicts, on the basis of the early Reform Act
decisions, that despite Congress's stated intent to resolve the split among the
circuits on the applicable pleading standard, the language of the Reform Act
and its legislative history have left the courts in a quandary. As a result, the
beginning of a new split between the circuits is already apparent and further
review by the circuits and the Supreme Court is likely.
Finally, this Article argues that the Reform Act's pleading standards do
not apply to the negligence and strict-liability claims of the Securities Act of
1933. Courts that fail to make this distinction diminish the enforcement
power of that Act. The early cases discussing such claims indicate that a
circuit split is equally likely on this issue as well.
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